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Abstract
Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), which are used to control much of the world’s
critical infrastructures, are highly vulnerable and exposed to the Internet. Many
efforts have been undertaken to develop decoys, or honeypots, of these devices in order
to characterize, attribute, or prevent attacks against Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
networks. Unfortunately, since ICS devices typically are proprietary and unique,
one emulation solution for a particular vendor’s model will not likely work on other
devices. Many previous efforts have manually developed ICS honeypots, but it is a
very time intensive process.
Thus, a scalable solution is needed in order to automatically configure PLC emula-
tors. The ScriptGenE Framework presented in this thesis leverages several techniques
used in reverse engineering protocols in order to automatically configure PLC emula-
tors using network traces. The accuracy, flexibility, and efficiency of the ScriptGenE
Framework is tested in three fully automated experiments.
Network traffic is generated by interrogating two PLCs with standard clients. An
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 PLC is interrogated with wget and RSLinx, and a
Siemens S7-300 is interrogated using STEP7. Reference traffic is captured and used to
build protocol state machines, and then the resultant emulators’ experimental traffic
is captured. Variability differences between the reference and experimental groups is
analyzed to assess the accuracy of the emulators.
Results from the experiments show that ScriptGenE can accurately emulate a
PLC’s webserver with only one input trace. Additionally, only five input EtherNet/IP
traces are required to create an emulator that is identified by RSLinx as a PLC with
modules. A minimum of two input traces are required to create a Siemens PLC
iv
emulator that can be browsed by STEP7. The web and EtherNet/IP experiments
resulted in zero incorrect bytes, and the experiments with STEP7 yielded at most
one incorrect byte per TCP connection. Additionally, the emulators produce traffic
that differs in variability from the reference capture group by less than 0.018% with
95% confidence.
Overall, this research provides numerous contributions including the first success-
ful automatically configured application layer honeypot for EtherNet/IP. ScriptGenE
requires less input traces than previous works. Additionally, a novel backtracking al-
gorithm is implemented that handles unknown transitions and allows for looping in
ICS polling sessions.
v
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AUTOMATIC CONFIGURATION OF PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC
CONTROLLER EMULATORS
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Modern societies such as the United States rely on ICS to provide basic services
such as water, electricity, and gas [Whi13]. These systems are made up of a network
of sensors and controlling devices [SFS11]. Due to the unique needs that this critical
infrastructure provides, past emphasis has been placed on ensuring simplicity, robust-
ness, and continuity of service. However, over time these systems were required to be
more interconnected and complex [SFS11, HCA+09]. Common ICS devices such as
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) have been shown to be increasingly connected
to the Internet, and it is apparent that security is not inherent in the design of these
exposed devices [San12]. Efforts to shore up vulnerabilities have proven to be diffi-
cult because most techniques that are common in the rapidly changing information
technology (IT) industry are not applicable in an environment where stability and
continuity of service are most important [SFS11, DBDS05]. Instead, resilient con-
trol system design must be employed by using network sensors to monitor device
states [CCG+11, VML14].
This need has been elevated by recent attacks on PLCs, such as Stuxnet, which
clearly show that these devices are targeted and can be abused to cause significant
physical effects [Fal10, HCA+09]. Targeting has become even easier with device iden-
tification techniques using Shodan [Wil89]. However, the scope of ICS attacks, as well
1
as the actors and motivations behind them are unclear. Deploying network sensors
such as honeypots has been shown to be an effective technique in characterizing and
attributing anomalous network behavior [MB09, STO+11, VML14].
Honeypots attempt to entice unauthorized network traffic by acting as a decoy
of a target device of interest [PH07]. Honeypots are characterized by the services
they provide and the level of interaction of those services. A high-interaction (HI)
honeypot provides a real system with real services, while a low-interaction (LI) hon-
eypot provides a simulated environment that only emulates selected services. Both
have their advantages and disadvantages, and they can be used together to form a
hybrid honeypot. HI honeypots are implemented using a monitored physical device or
virtual machine (VM) that resembles the target device, while LI honeypot emulators
require only knowledge of their selected services’ behavior. Many solutions exist to
quickly set up these network sensors for an IT network.
1.2 Motivation
Developing honeypots for PLCs, however, poses some interesting challenges. PLCs
can cost thousands of dollars each, so using physical honeypots is not scalable. Also,
since PLC hardware and software are typically proprietary and unique, it requires
significant time and knowledge to reverse engineer the system in order to develop an
emulator. Even then, one emulation solution for a particular vendor’s model will not
likely work for other devices.
Proxying is one technique that can be used to offset the above challenge, but it is
still not scalable since a single real device can only handle so many requests. Another
technique is to automate the creation of a LI honeypot. Tools such as Honeyd can
emulate at the network level of the protocol stack [Pro13], and it can be automatically
configured by capturing network traffic [VM14, HH13, Hie04, KSAMA04]. Addition-
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ally, the application layer emulation can be automatically trained by partially reverse
engineering protocols from network traces and/or program binaries [LC11].
Together, a HI honeypot proxy and a trained LI honeypot form a hybrid solution
where the trained LI honeypot handles all requests that it knows how to handle
[PH07]. New (more interesting) traffic is proxied to the real PLC, and the LI honeypot
can use the real PLC’s response to refine its training. With this setup, the frontend
LI honeypot acts as a traffic filter, allowing the system as a whole to handle more
requests.
SGNET [LD08], and GQ [CPW06], are two hybrid honeypot systems. Both
were tested on IT networks. However, a Critical Infrastructure Security Analy-
sis (CRISALIS) project presentation by Symantec researcher Corrado Leita (author
of ScriptGen) seems to indicate that SGNET is also being used on Siemens PLCs in
order to assess the security of Europe’s power grid [Lei12]. To date, however, no re-
search or performance metrics have been published that show the suitability of either
of these hybrid honeypot systems for usage in ICS networks. Suitability with one
brand of PLC such as Siemens also does not guarantee suitability for other manufac-
turers’ products. Each have their own proprietary hardware, software, and network
protocols. Additionally, source code for the projects has not been released, so it is
not possible to do a comparative suitability study.
Thus, there is a need to develop an open-source hybrid honeypot system that is
optimized for ICS networks. This research focuses on developing the self-learning LI
honeypot portion of the hybrid system.
1.3 Research Goals
The goal of this research is to develop and test a flexible framework that can
automatically configure the emulation behavior of a networked PLC using network
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traces. This configuration must be able to be done without any knowledge of the
network protocol used. Additionally, the emulation must be accurate enough to be
able to generate traffic that is acceptable to industry standard tools, and is also not
statistically different than normal traffic generated by the target device.
It is hypothesized that a target device’s behavior (as seen from the network) for
a particular task can be accurately emulated with as little as three training traces.
1.4 Approach
A framework is developed that is primarily based off of ScriptGen’s design [LMD05,
LDM06], but with some novel features that allow the resultant emulators to robustly
handle unknown state transitions and keep communicating on the long, often repeat-
ing sessions that are typical with PLC master/slave polling architectures. Addition-
ally, contextual information is derived from the network traffic similar to Roleplayer’s
design [CPWK06] in order to dynamically change Internet Protocol (IP) addresses,
host names, and port numbers.
Network traffic is generated by interrogating two PLCs. The first PLC is an
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 PLC equipped with EtherNet Industrial Protocol
(EtherNet/IP) ENBT and DC Output modules. Interrogation is done by running
wget on the PLC webserver and also by requesting module information via Rock-
well’s RSLinx software. The other PLC is a Siemens S7-300 equipped with dis-
crete and analog input/output. This PLC is interrogated using Siemens’ SIMATIC
STEP7 software to browse module information. Collected Hypertext Transfer Pro-
tocol (HTTP), EtherNet/IP, and ISO Transport Service Access Point (ISO-TSAP)
captures are used to generate respective protocol state machines.
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1.4.1 Protocol state machine generation.
The primary script parses desired traffic from a packet capture file and recur-
sively builds protocol state machines (SMs). Each SM is represented by a tree with
the nodes corresponding to server messages and the edges corresponding to client
messages. Messages are initially clustered by the order of appearance in the ses-
sion, and then they are clustered again using Unweighted Pair Group Method with
Arithmetic Mean (UPGMA) with a distance matrix based off of the Smith-Waterman
algorithm [SW81]. The resultant cluster (phylogenetic tree) is used to perform pro-
gressive multiple alignment using the Needleman-Wunsch algorithm [NW70]. The
byte-aligned messages allow for fixed and mutating regions to be identified. Pyloge-
netic tree creation and alignment is powered by the Protocol Informatics Framework
[Bed04a].
Next, message fields, or regions, are identified using ScriptGen’s Region Analysis
algorithm [LMD05]. A regular expression is created to represent the cluster and
contextual links (session IDs, etc) are identified. A default error message is then
selected from among the server response. Finally, the protocol tree is exported as a
Python pickle file.
1.4.2 Protocol replay.
Two scripts are developed that import the generated protocol tree and allow for
traffic replay. The primary script emulates the server, and the other emulates the
client. The client emulation script simply randomly walks down the protocol tree,
and it is used primarily for testing the tree against itself or fuzzing the PLC. The
server replay script includes a novel backtracking algorithm developed to robustly
handle unknown transitions and allow for message looping.
5
1.4.3 Experimentation.
Three experiments are developed to test the primary protocols of the L61 and
S7-300 PLCs. A HTTP test uses wget to download pages from the L61’s webserver
while the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP experiments browse chassis modules on the
L61 and S7-300, respectively. Each experiment is designed to test emulator accuracy
and to also determine the number of required traces for successful emulation. All
experiments involve a scripted collection of reference captures. Random combinations
of these captures are then used to build protocol trees. Next, each tree is used to
emulate server responses in order to generate experimental captures. All captures are
randomized, allowing several task runs to occur prior to capturing traffic.
Once all random captures are complete, the packet capture files are compared in
pairs to measure the amount of variability between each pair. Comparisons count the
number of different bytes between each file. Variability differences in the reference
captures serves as a baseline. This is statistically compared to the variability found
between the experimental and reference capture pairs. Any significant difference in
variability indicates that the traffic produced by the emulator is different.
Additionally each test measures accuracy by a second criteria–interrogator output.
For the HTTP test, downloaded Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) directories are
compared. Comparisons include measuring the number of bytes downloaded and the
number of identical and different files. For the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP exper-
iments, the output of the RSLinx and STEP7 graphical interfaces, respectively, are
scored as a pass or fail. This is automatically done using OpenCV image recognition
software and SikuliX [Hoc15].
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1.5 Assumptions and Limitations
This research provides a proof of concept framework for automatically configuring
PLC emulators based solely on a limited number of network traces. All trace-based
approaches have limitations since it is typically not possible to glean the entire state
of a network device solely from bytes sent over the network. Additional limitations
apply to this proof of concept’s current implementation and can be resolved in future
work.
1.5.1 Limitations inherent with network trace-based approaches.
There are two limitations that are true with any approach that attempts to mimic
network behavior based solely on network traces. For one, only traffic similar to what
was previously seen can be emulated. This is particularly important for identifying
fields of messages that should vary. If a particular byte is always seen as one value,
there is no way for the emulator to know that in reality it can (and should) vary.
Therefore, the quality of emulation is directly related to the quality of the inputted
network traces. This research assumes that the traces generated are not missing any
packets, but it does not assume by default that two traces are different in all the
bytes that do vary.
Secondly, traffic that is encrypted is not able to be emulated correctly unless that
traffic has no dynamic fields (all content is fixed and can be simply be replayed as is).
1.5.2 Network protocols involved.
Only HTML, EtherNet/IP, and ISO-TSAP are tested. In addition, emulation is
performed only on the application layer of the network stack. The tested framework
can be extended to emulate the transport layer or it can be used as a subsystem
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in Honeyd to provide lower level emulation [PH07]. Finally, the tools currently only
support Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4).
1.5.3 Single connection server.
The current implementation of the replay script only supports one connection at a
time. None of the experimental tasks chosen require multiple concurrent connections,
but a task such as capturing web browser traffic requires an update to the replay
script.
1.5.4 Limited set of tasks and traces.
For this proof of concept, only one task is formally tested for each of the three pro-
tocols. There are many more complex conversations that can be tested (particularly
those that use EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP). Additionally, the traces are generated
in a laboratory environment and are not representative of the typical traffic seen in a
production environment. Production traces have many conversations in them, requir-
ing the protocol tree generation software to work harder at clustering and aligning
messages. Processing time could potentially become a factor. This can be mitigated
somewhat by using capture filters and limiting the size of the resultant protocol tree.
1.5.5 Limited configuration setup.
Only one hardware and firmware configuration is tested for each PLC. Allen-
Bradley has other PLC models such as CompactLogix, various chassis sizes and
configuration possibilities (input and output modules) for ControlLogix, and many
firmware versions. Similarly, Siemens has a variety of other models and configura-
tions to choose from. All of these factors could potentially affect server responses.
Therefore, the generated trees may only be valid for the configurations tested. More
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traces would likely be required to accurately emulate other configurations. It should
be noted that Leita et al. showed in [LDM06] that ScriptGen required only 50 traces
to accurately emulate behavior for over 50 Windows configurations.
1.5.6 Timing not considered.
Real and emulated conversation flows may differ in timing, but it is assumed that
this will not adversely affect the content of those flows.
1.5.7 Interrogators may ignore or accept invalid responses.
Scripted interrogators in particular may ignore unexpected emulator responses
and provide no indication that anything is out of the ordinary. Certain responses
may be critical for the script to continue without error. However, any deviation from
the expected messages from either the client or server are detected when comparing
packet capture byte variability as described in the experimental approach.
1.6 Thesis Overview
Chapter II provides background and related research on honeypot technology,
reverse engineering protocol techniques, and usage of those techniques in developing
advanced honeypots. Chapter III covers a detailed description of the developed frame-
work. Chapters IV and V cover experimental design and results. Finally, Chapter VI
presents the research conclusions and future work.
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II. Background and Related Research
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides a background of why Industrial Control Systems are im-
portant, how they are vulnerable, and how honeypots can be used to secure them.
It is shown that traditional security paradigms are not sufficient because control sys-
tem devices are insecure by design. Instead, the state of these devices needs to be
monitored using network sensors such as honeypots.
A brief background on networking is provided as a prerequisite to understanding
honeypot technology. Additionally, several algorithms are discussed in Section 2.2.7
that are important to techniques used in developing protocol-agnostic emulators.
Finally, a thorough survey of honeypot technology and protocol reverse engineering
techniques is provided.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Industrial Control Systems.
Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines 16 sectors of the United States as critical
infrastructure [Whi13]. These include areas such as food, transportation, chemicals,
energy, water, and nuclear reactors. ICS are used in all of the above in order to
provide reliable, safe, efficient, and automated service [SFS11].
Industrial Control Systems, which include supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems, can be broken up into three main components. Figure 1 shows
that these components are a human machine interface (HMI), remote diagnostics and
maintenance, and a control loop [SFS11]. Within the control loop are a set of sensors
that provide data to the controller. The controller uses the sensor readings, which
could be as simple as the level of water, in order to autonomously make decisions about
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how to affect the controlled process. For instance, when the water level becomes too
high the controller can command an actuator to open a valve. This autonomous
feedback loop provides an abstraction to the controlled process, making it easier for
human operators to manage it (typically via the HMI).
Figure 1. ICS block diagram [SFS11]
Breaking down the components further, Figure 2 shows a general SCADA layout
[SFS11]. This figure helps to highlight the fact the ICS equipment can be separated
by great geographic distance. Several data links connect various parts of the ICS.
The primary control center contains components such as the HMI, a data historian
(control process log server), and master terminal unit (MTU). The MTU polls the
remote terminal units (RTUs) in a master/slave communication style in order to
collect specific data. The RTUs process and summarize the data collected from the
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sensors (not shown) over time. Next, the intelligent electronic device (IED) is a smart
sensor that performs some local data processing. Finally, it should be noted that a
PLC can be used as a RTU (as shown) or a controller.
Figure 2. General SCADA layout [SFS11]
In fact, PLCs are one of the most flexible components in ICS. They can control,
monitor, and manage sensors and actuators in a variety of settings and configurations
by using modules. Each vertical slot shown on the PLC in Figure 2 could be a
module for digital or analog input/output, a communications module, a controller,
etc. A PLC is typically made with vendor-specific hardware and firmware, and they
can be programmed remotely for specific applications using software such as Ladder
Logic [SFS11].
2.2.2 Allen-Bradley PLCs.
Allen-Bradley is a common PLC vendor in the United States. They provide a wide
range of controllers such as the ControlLogix and MicroLogix families. This research
focuses on the former. Common controllers from the ControlLogix family include
the L6x and L7x controllers. The controllers manage communications between other
modules (such as input/output) across the chassis backplane. At least one of the
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other modules is for external communications such as a Web+ or EtherNetIP ENBT
module. They provide a network interface for the PLC and contain a web server for
viewing device statistics and configuration.
Further device configuration can be done remotely via Rockwell’s RSLogix soft-
ware suite. RSLogix allows an operator to remotely monitor, control, troubleshoot,
and program PLCs. Programming includes updating firmware and application soft-
ware. For the latter, RSLogix can be used to develop and perform runtime analysis
of Ladder Logic. All of these remote capabilities depend on communication drivers
which are managed by a program called RSLinx. Before any communication to the
PLC can occur, one must first set up a driver and browse for the device using RSLinx’s
RSWho interface. RSLogix has a similar interface called WhoActive that can be used
to browse for devices once an appropriate driver is set up.
2.2.3 Siemens PLCs.
Siemens is also a common PLC vendor, and it is particularly popular in Europe.
Siemens provides many models of controllers including the S7-200, S7-300, and S7-
1200. This research uses the S7-300. The software that controls these PLCs is called
SIMATIC STEP7. Rather than setting up a driver as with the Allen-Bradley models,
in STEP7 a network node must be configured to upload station objects (e.g., PLC
module information).
2.2.4 Industrial Control Systems (in)security.
Unfortunately, the great flexibility and reliability of ICS devices do not provide
adequate security for today’s interconnected networks. An example of the inherently
insecure designs of PLCs, for instance, can be seen in Digital Bond’s Project Basecamp
[San12]. As a part of Project Basecamp, Santamarta used legitimate commands to
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remotely exploit an Allen-Bradley ControlLogix L61 PLC with an attached ENBT/A
module. He was able to remotely change the device’s IP address, force a CPU halt or
crash, crash the ENBT, change or capture firmware, and more. The vulnerabilities
that Santamarta exploited were not software bugs; they were features of the design
for ease of use. PLCs have also been exploited out in the wild such as in the much
publicized Stuxnet attacks that damaged nuclear centrifuges [Fal10].
Exploitation of ICS devices is expected to rise as control systems become more
interconnected and more complex [SFS11, HCA+09]. With the advent of Shodan,
an Internet search engine for embedded devices, finding vulnerable PLCs has become
even easier. Researchers have used crafted Shodan queries in order to enumerate, cat-
alog, and create visual mappings for vulnerable ICS devices [Lev11, Hig13]. Williams
extended this work by showing how to use downloaded device tags to make PLC
identification specific enough to enumerate by industry and function [Wil89].
However, while it is clear that Shodan makes it easier to identify vulnerable de-
vices, it is unclear whether Shodan affects how often ICS devices are attacked. In
two 2013 TrendMicro reports, Wilhoit seeded Google and Shodan with entries for
several honeypots that he placed on public IP addresses around the world. The first
experiment lasted 28 days and resulted in 12 targeted attacks [Wil13b], and the sec-
ond experiment lasted four months and resulted in 74 targeted attacks [Wil13a]. It is
unclear, however, how many attacks were targeted against HMIs and how many were
targeted against PLCs [Wil89].
In 2014, Bodenheim performed an experiment to test the impact Shodan has on
PLC network activity [Bod19]. Over 55 days, four Allen-Bradley PLCs were deployed
to an ICS network address space with Internet-facing IP addresses. Two PLCs used
default configurations, and two PLCs used modified service banners so they could
be targeted easier via Shodan. Contrary to Wilhoit’s research, no targeted attacks
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were found over the testing period. It was concluded that Shodan had no significant
experimental impact on device targeting [Bod19].
Regardless of Shodan, ICS exploitation is on the rise [SFS11, HCA+09]. The
implications of this can be very serious as Huang et al. showed in [HCA+09]. They
designed threat models in order to assess the impacts of denial of service (DoS) and
integrity attacks against PLCs used in chemical processes. Their findings showed
that targeting the reactor pressure sensor could result in an unsafe state (i.e., cause
reactor shutdown or explosion).
The real question, then, is what should be done to prevent critical infrastructure
devices from being exploited? National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
published a guide for ICS security in 2011 that helps to address this question [SFS11].
The guide clearly identifies the root of the problem: ICS devices are different from
IT devices. Control systems were originally isolated special-purpose networks that
were optimized using proprietary hardware, software, and protocols. Over time, these
special-purpose networks were interconnected with business networks in order to drive
down costs and make timely business decisions based upon real-time control system
data. This caused a classical example of requirements creep because the control
system devices were not designed for networks with potentially untrusted parties.
As was discussed previously with Project Basecamp [San12], many control system
devices will do anything a remotely connected user requests.
Unfortunately, ICS networks cannot be patched or updated in the same manner
as IT networks [SFS11]. While IT networks are designed to prioritize data integrity
and confidentiality, ICS networks prioritize availability and safety above all else. This
should not be surprising as no company, for example, wants to be known as the one
that can only provide power or clean water 20 hours a day. Control systems provide
time-sensitive services, so providing down time for patching and rebooting machines
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in order to improve security is difficult [SFS11, DBDS05]. Approximately 90% of
the companies providing services using control systems are privately owned [SFS11].
From the business perspective, the guaranteed consequences (costs) simply outweigh
the risks associated with potential attacks.
Additionally, the risks associated with attempting to secure these devices is com-
pounded by the fact that they are old. Compared to IT equipment with an average
operational lifespan of three to five years, ICS devices remain in production for 15-20
years [SFS11]. This means that recent security methods often do not work, and they
sometimes can be downright hazardous. For instance Duggan, Berg, Dillinger, and
Stamp cited many issues with typical penetration techniques [DBDS05]. Simple ping
sweeps were identified as being responsible for unexpected robotic arm movement and,
in an fabrication plant, led to the destruction of $50K worth of integrated circuits.
Another incident was cited where a penetration test caused customers to lose gas
service for four hours. Since ICS devices are often several generations behind their IT
counterparts, their resources (e.g., memory and processing) can be easily exhausted.
One of the common methods to help alleviate risks associated with corporate and
ICS interconnectivity is to ensure that the two networks are separated [DBDS05,
SFS11]. Figure 3 shows NIST’s recommended network configuration for splitting the
corporate and control networks using a firewalled neutral network (DMZ) [SFS11].
The idea is to minimize untrusted traffic from reaching the control network.
However, separating the networks does not deal with the crux of the matter:
ICS devices are fragile and too trustful. Instead, there must be a paradigm shift
to “resilient control systems” [RGM09]. These are defined by Rieger, Gertman, and
McQueen as systems that:
. . . maintain state awareness and an accepted level of operational nor-
malcy in reponse to disturbances, including threats of an unexpected and
malicious nature [RGM09].
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Figure 3. ICS network configuration recommended by NIST [SFS11]
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This concept of “state awareness” was addressed by Carcano et al.’s Critical State
Analysis technique [CCG+11]. They recognized that most control systems have well
documented critical states and that the state of the system can be monitored to
detect when it is converging on a critical state. In order to do this effectively, several
metrics were proposed that yield a distance of the current state to a critical state. In
contrast to signature-based methods, Carcano et al. cited their method as effective
for detecting zero day attacks.
Finally, other researchers have called on new anomaly detection paradigms for
ICS [MB09, VML14, STO+11]. McQueen and Boyer’s research cited deception as a
needed technique for control system defense [MB09]. Their research mapped different
methods of data hiding and information falsification to seven abstract dimensions
of security. Further research showed that hybrid sensors consisting of intrusion de-
tection systems and honeypots proved to be much more effective than traditional
techniques [VML14, STO+11].
In summary, Industrial Control Systems have been shown to be critical for pro-
viding every day services, yet these systems are exposed and vulnerable to cyber
threats. Securing control systems with traditional IT methods is not effective, be-
cause vital components such as PLCs are aging and were designed to openly trust
other devices. Thus, a new paradigm is needed based on autonomously maintaining
awareness of the system’s current state. Researchers have proposed new network sen-
sors to accomplish this, and honeypots are an integral part of that solution. To that
end, Section 2.2.6 provides an overview of current honeypot technology after a brief
prerequisite networking review.
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2.2.5 Networking and protocols.
This section includes a very brief overview of some networking principles and
network protocols of interest for this research. They are an important prerequisite
for understanding how honeypots work including the one designed in this research.
For more networking basics the reader is referred to [KR13].
2.2.5.1 Networking review [KR13].
Network protocols define how two devices talk to one another. Internet protocols
are layered so that they are more modular and easier to maintain. Figure 4 shows
that the basic protocol layers are divided into five parts. Each layer includes a header
and payload, where the payload consists of the layers above it. For this research, the
discussions will primarily concern the transport and application layers.
Figure 4. Internet Protocol stack [KR13]
The transport layer facilitates communication between two processes. If the pro-
cesses are on the same host, then interprocess communication can be used. Otherwise,
messages (data segments) need to be passed between the hosts using a transport pro-
tocol such as TCP or User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Both protocols use source and
destination ports as can be seen in Figure 5. The ports, along with the source and
destination IP addresses are collectively called a four-tuple. The four-tuple is used to
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identify which socket the data segment should go to, and the socket corresponds to a
specific application process.
Figure 5. TCP and UDP segment format [KR13]
Once the application payload is delivered to the right process, the application
layer processes it according to the protocol in that layer. For instance, when a web
page is retrieved from a server, HTTP is the application layer protocol used to deliver
the HTML code to the browser application. The browser then interprets the markup
language and displays the results.
Overall, the process described can be thought of in terms of receiving mail. The
sender marks the mail with their address (source IP) and the destination address
(destination IP). The mail is transfered to the destination house via a network layer
protocol (IP). Then, a transport layer protocol (TCP) delivers the mail to the des-
tination door (a socket). Once inside the house the mail envelope is opened by an
application layer protocol (HTTP), and the letter is read (HTML).
It is important to note here that the application layer itself can have other layers
within it. For instance EtherNet/IP, which will be described later, feeds into a higher
protocol called Common Industrial Protocol (CIP).
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It should also be noted that TCP is a connection-oriented protocol that provides
reliable transfers. This is accomplished in many ways, but of important interest
for this research is how TCP establishes a connection and how it tears one down.
Referring back to Figure 5, TCP includes some important fields in the “other header
fields” section of the segment. These include a 4-byte sequence number, a 4-byte
acknowledgment number, and several single bit flags. Figure 6 shows how TCP
establishes a connection using these additional fields. The client first attempts to
establish a connection by sending a SYN message (SYN flag set). At this time the
initial sequence number (ISN) is established. If the server agrees to accept the request,
it replies back with a SYN-ACK (SYN and ACK flags set) and its respective ISN.
The ACK flag indicates that the acknowledgment field is valid. That field indicates
what byte is expected next from the other party. After the client receives the SYN-
ACK from the server, it replies back with another ACK. From this point on, the
connection is established until torn down. Sequence and acknowledgment numbers
continue to increase with the size of the data sent and received. Because of this, even
if the messages are received out of order, the application layer can reorder them by
the sequence numbers.
After the client decides to end the connection, the proper way to initiate it is to
send a FIN flag (see Figure 7). The server then acknowledges this and sends any final
data. After the server is done it tells the client it is finished. After this the client
sends the final ACK.
2.2.5.2 Application layer protocols of interest.
The protocols of interest for this research include HTTP, EtherNet/IP, CIP, and
ISO-TSAP. HTTP is a stateless, text-based protocol defined in RFC 2616 that
facilitates the transfer of hypertext [FGM+99]. Fields are separated by spaces and
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Figure 6. Establishing a TCP connection [KR13]
Figure 7. Closing a TCP connection [KR13]
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the header is broken into lines using carriage return plus newlines (‘\r\n’). There
are request and response messages. Request messages typically use GET or POST
methods to retrieve resources identified by a uniform resource locator (URL). The
hostname of the server and other information is also included in the header which
is followed by a blank line. Figure 8 show an example of a GET request. Response
messages include a status line, date, content-length, and other header lines, a blank
line, and finally the data. Figure 9 shows an example of a HTTP response message.
Figure 8. HTTP GET request from Wireshark
Figure 9. HTTP reponse from Wireshark (data not shown)
EtherNet/IP and CIP were developed to bridge the communication gap between
automation devices and to also capitalize on the prevalent use of Ethernet and
TCP/IP [Bro01]. Modern automation network architectures are required to provide
control, configuration management, and data collection capabilities. Often separate
networks are used for each task, but devices must be able to communicate efficiently
together. This used to be difficult because different devices communicated with dif-
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ferent protocols across different media. Then the standard protocols of EtherNet/IP,
ControlNet, DeviceNet, and CompoNet were all unified under a standard application
protocol–CIP.
CIP is supported by several vendors and Open DeviceNet Vendors Association
(ODVA). It is able to effectively communicate by using an object-oriented ap-
proach based on a producer/consumer model [Bro01]. Contrary to the traditional
IT paradigm of using source and destination addresses, CIP is designed to allow data
to be identified by class objects and IDs. A standard set of device profiles and objects
with attributes are defined which allow for plug-and-play interoperability between de-
vices from various vendors. Typical objects include those such as for device identity,
type, and functions. Vendors are encouraged to use the standard public objects, but
class IDs 100-199 are reserved for vendor specific objects. Typically, vendors define
their own object values [Dun13].
CIP has two types of messages: explicit and implicit. Explicit messages are sent
over TCP port 44818 for multi-purpose communication that follow the typical re-
quest/response paradigm. All explicit messages are sent through the Message Router
object. Implicit messages are sent over UDP port 2222 and are used for application-
specific I/O transfers. The primary implicit types of messages are polled, cyclic,
strobed (multi-cast poll), and changed state [Bro01].
As can be seen in the CIP object model in Figure 10, access to any internal
object model is obtained through the Unconnected Message Manager (UCMM) or
Connection Manager (CM) [Bro01]. As the names imply, a connection must first be
established (have a Connection ID) prior to routing through the CM.
The last protocol of interest, ISO-TSAP, is a protocol used by Siemens devices
over TCP port 102. In a similar fashion as CIP, ISO-TSAP enables encapsulation of
Siemens’ proprietary control protocol called PROFINET. PROFINET allows control
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Figure 10. CIP object model [Bro01]
networks to utilize Ethernet versus the older PROFIBUS protocol that only allowed
communication on specialized buses.
2.2.6 Honeypots.
Honeypots are a type of network sensor that attempt to entice unauthorized net-
work traffic by acting as a decoy of a target device of interest [PH07]. They are
typically passive in nature (i.e., they do not speak unless spoken to). Because of this,
honeypots do not suffer from exhibiting false positives that signature-based intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) do since all traffic received is suspicious. Additionally, hon-
eypots can detect unknown attacks and overcome evasion or obfuscation techniques
that are common with signature-based tools. Their uses include trapping malware
samples for research, stopping botnets in their tracks, characterizing attacks, catching
“bad guys” in the act (attribution), slowing down or deflecting attacks, and perform-
ing security training.
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In [STO+11] researchers used honeypots to monitor attacks across the Internet
for three years resulting in a treasure trove of information. The collected data set,
called “Kyoto 2006+”, included 425,719 sessions of unknown attacks. These ses-
sions did not trigger IDS alerts, but the extracted shell code was detected as mali-
cious. The collected shellcodes also included 27 new variants of those used by the
Win32/Conficker.A worm during its development period. Finally, statistics were done
on all of the data to determine such things as the distribution of attacks, shellcode,
end-point addresses, ports, countries involved, and more.
Honeypots are typically characterized by the services they provide and the level
of interaction of those services. There are a variety of designs that tradeoff fidelity,
security, and performance [PH07]. Fidelity refers to how realistic the honeypot service
is, while performance refers to how many interactions or connections a honeypot can
handle at a time. Finally the security of a honeypot is determined by how difficult it
is for an adversary to reconfigure it or misuse it to harm other systems. The following
discussion gives a brief survey of honeypot types and their enabling technologies.
2.2.6.1 High interaction honeypots.
A HI honeypot provides a real system with real services [PH07]. Because of this
they have high fidelity. However, more effort must be taken to ensure that they are
not misused to harm other systems. Additionally, their performance might not be
scalable. HI honeypots are implemented using a monitored physical device or VM
that resembles the target device. Monitoring tools can include those typical of regular
operated systems such as a host-based IDS, system logs, etc.
A better monitoring alternative is Sebek or its less detectable successor Qebek
[SHZ10]. Sebek stealthily logs user activity by using replacing system calls with its
own [PH07]. In doing so, the normal system logs are bypassed, and all the user
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activity data is sent to a remote server for analysis. Replacing system calls is one
of the techniques rootkits use to avoid detection, but unfortunately Sebek is still
detectable since its packets leaving the machine are inconsistent with the system
logs.
The server that collects the user activity is often a Honeywall server [hon09].
Honeywall can capture, control, and analyze data [PH07]. It acts as a transparent
bridge between external networks and the network of honeypots (honeynet). As
mentioned previously, one of the dangers of using a HI honeypot is that an adversary
can use it to harm other machines. The Honeywall helps to prevent this by limiting
outgoing connections and using Snort-inline. The latter essentially sterilizes packets
seen as harmful before they leave the network.
Next, Argos is an interesting HI honeypot that uses a technique called dynamic
taint analysis to detect 0-day exploits [PH07]. Dynamic taint analysis works by
marking untrusted data streams such as those received over network. Any data
structures that are modified by the marked data become tainted as well. The marked
data is tracked in memory, and once it is used to affect execution flow an execution
trace is generated. This allows Argos to detect how and when an exploit takes place.
As will be discussed in the Section 2.3, dynamic taint analysis can also used to reverse
engineer network protocols.
2.2.6.2 Low interaction honeypots.
A LI honeypot provides a simulated environment that only emulates selected
services. Because only selected services are emulated, LI honeypots are typically
easier to configure and maintain, and they can focus their resources on handling more
connections than a HI honeypot would [PH07]. Lacking a full operating system that
can be exploited, they also are less likely to be used by an adversary to attack other
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machines. The tradeoff to these benefits are that they are much easier to identify
(fingerprint) as fakes.
Due to their selectivity, their are also a much greater variety of LI honeypots than
HI honeypots. Some, such as LaBrea, tarpit (slow down) traffic by manipulating
TCP window sizes [PH07]. Others, such as tinyHoneypot, provide adversaries with
easy access to a limited root shell via vulnerable services. Arguably one of the most
popular LI honeypots is Honeyd.
Honeyd is not really a honeypot itself; it is a honeypot factory. Honeyd allows the
creation of thousands of virtual hosts running arbitrary services by simply editing
a few text configuration files [PH07, Pro13]. Honeypot personalities and services
are selected using templates. Templates support inheriting attributes from other
templates, and they can be used to replicate as many honeypot virtual hosts as
desired.
However, Honeyd actually only emulates at the network and transport protocol
layers [PH07]. It even emulates network topologies. Application layer emulation,
on the other hand, requires service scripts. These scripts are written in shell or
Python, and many are included with Honeyd. Additionally, Honeyd can use real
network services as subsystems. Honeyd accomplishes this by hooking into low level
networking calls.
Another noteworthy honeypot is nepenthes [BKH+06] and its successor dion-
aea [BK13]. Nepenthes is optimized to catch malware (particularly self-propagating
worms). This is done by providing many vulnerable service modules. Once a module
is exploited, a shellcode module unpacks the malware and downloads the real payload.
This can then be automatically stored in a database or submitted to anti-virus ven-
dors. In the case where a suitable vulnerability module is not found, the adversary’s
packets can be redirected to a HI honeypot.
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2.2.6.3 Active honeypots.
The previously discussed honeypots are all passive in nature. These all take the
role of a server and expect malevolent traffic to find them. However, client system
vulnerabilities are just as important a security issue. Client honeypots actively seek
out malicious content by pretending to be an end-user [PH07]. This might be as simple
as having an automated email client or web browser that clicks on every link (e.g.,
HoneyClient). The more advanced HI client honeypots use techniques like dynamic
taint analysis discussed previously to assess exactly how their found payload affects
them.
A more recent project uses an active honeypot methodology called bait and trap.
Beeswarm attempts to lure in attackers by having drone clients leak tantalizing infor-
mation in communications with a honeypot server [Ves15]. The leaked information,
also known as a bait session, provides potential attackers with vital information such
as login credentials.
2.2.6.4 Hybrid honeypots.
As mentioned previously, honeypot designs make a trade between fidelity, security,
and performance [PH07]. LI honeypots typically have lower fidelity, but are easier
to secure and can focus resources for better performance. HI honeypots, on the
other hand, sacrifice performance and demand more security measures in order to
provide high fidelity. Hybrid honeypot designs attempt to provide the benefits of
both approaches. They typically achieve this by filtering traffic prior to it being sent
to a HI honeypot.
Collapsar is one example of a filter and redirect approach [JXW06]. Collapsar uses
distributed redirectors to tunnel only traffic of interest to a centralized honeyfarm.
The honeyfarm consists of a group of HI honeypot VMs, a management station,
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and a correlation engine. The correlation engine coalesces data from the distributed
networks to detect attack trends. Additionally, the honeyfarm has a frontend gateway
that acts similar to a Honeywall server. The frontend and redirectors both use Snort-
inline to throttle and sterilize outgoing traffic. Overall, the scalability of this approach
hinges on the efficacy of the frontend. Multiple frontends may have to be employed
to achieve the desired results.
Potemkin, on the other hand, achieves scalability by efficient resource usage
[VMC+05]. Specifically, Potemkin only provides honeypot instances as they are
needed. Once an instance is no longer required, its resources are reclaimed. A set of
reference VMs are cloned on demand using copy-on-write methods. This means that
only changed files require new memory to be used. A gateway router then dynami-
cally binds a destination IP address to the new honeypot, allowing traffic to flow to
it. The router also performs load balancing, proxies selected outbound services, and
prevents unauthorized traffic from leaving the network by reflecting it inward. The
reflection capability is particularly interesting in that instead of allowing malicious
traffic to leave the network, the traffic is redirected to a brand new honeypot instance.
Thus, propagating malware can be observed spreading. Finally, a scan filter limits
how fast any one external IP can cause VMs to be instantiated.
A third hybrid honeypot example is honeybrid, which was developed by Robin
Berthier [Ber35, Ber13]. Honeybrid is an open-source project that uses Honeyd as a
LI frontend filter. Argos or nepenthes is used on the backend for HI emulation. Hon-
eybrid’s architecture consists of four main components, namely: 1) a decision engine,
2) a control engine, 3) a redirection engine, and 4) a log server. The decision engine
controls the frontend filter. Essentially, it defines and selects a Honeyd template.
Note, that the application layer emulation is completely dependent on the service
script selected for the Honeyd template. Next, the control engine limits outgoing
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connections similar to the previous projects. Finally, the redirection engine acts as
a proxy and replayer to the selected backend honeypot. Replaying the session from
the frontend is important in order for the backend to catch up to what it missed.
Otherwise, the backend honeypot’s state would be out of sync with the session, and
the resultant response would be incorrect. This replaying technique is used in other
hybrid honeypots that is discussed in Section 2.3.5.
2.2.6.5 Summary.
In summary, honeypots are a very useful tool for network security. There are
many variations that can cater to most needs. By using a creative mix of LI and HI
honeypots a scalable, yet high-fidelty honeynet can be created.
However, all of the LI honeypots discussed so far can only handle published pro-
tocols. Emulating proprietary software and applications is difficult [vdHvW05]. In
order for emulators to handle proprietary or unknown protocols in a scalable man-
ner, techniques must be used to automatically reverse engineer the protocols. The
techniques required build upon algorithms and constructs discussed in Section 2.2.7.
2.2.7 Common algorithms and constructs used in reversing protocols.
Reverse engineering protocols is similar to trying to learn a new language. First, a
vocabulary of words must be built. Second, appropriate grammar must be learned to
group and order the words correctly. For network protocols, the equivalent respective
constructs are messages formats (vocabulary) and state machines (grammar). Both
are required in order for a network protocol to be completely understood.
The method used to accomplish the above greatly depends on what is available
as input. Most techniques use network traces and/or program binaries to gather the
required information [LC11]. For inferring a message format using network traces,
generally most techniques first cluster messages, and then they align the messages
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in each cluster in order to partition the fields [BGH14]. Inferring the state machine
usually involves building up a model based on the identified message formats, and
then minimizing the model using probabilistic methods.
2.2.7.1 Clustering.
UPGMA. The primary clustering algorithm of interest for this research is
UPGMA [NTT83]. The algorithm is considered a hierarchical clustering algorithm,
and in the context of this research it is used to create guide trees for multiple sequence
alignment (MSA). A general expression for the UPGMA algorithm is
dij =
1
| Ci || Cj |
∑
p∈Ci,q∈Cj
dpq (1)
where dij is the distance between clusters Ci and Cj, and dpq is the distance between
cluster elements [Bed04a].
In words this means that the distance between any two clusters is equivalent to the
average of all the distances between pairs of elements, with each cluster contributing
one element for each pair. Overall, the algorithm’s final tree reflects the structure of
the distance matrix in a hierarchical fashion.
The distance between elements is defined in a distance matrix. One way to create
this is to perform an alignment algorithm to calculate the scores (see Section 2.2.7.2).
The tree is built from the bottom up [Edw13]. First find the shortest pairwise
distance and cluster the two elements. The branch distance is then equivalent to half
the shortest pairwise distance that was found. Then, all of the other distances must
be updated with respect to the new cluster. This process continues until all clusters
are joined. The root is implicitly set at a depth of half the mean pairwise distance.
Figure 11 shows an example of a tree generated using UPGMA. The right side of the
figure shows the depth of the tree at each level.
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Figure 11. An example tree generated using UPGMA [Edw13]
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k-means and k-medoids. Another group of clustering algorithms is based
on k-means and k-medoids [Ber06]. Both algorithms are considered partitional and
attempt to minimize average dissimilarity between selected centers of k clusters and
the other members within each respective cluster. The difference between the two is
on the choice of cluster center. k-means uses a mean value (centroid) to determine the
center, while k-medoids (e.g., Partition Around Medoids (PAM)) uses the centrally
located data point (the one that has minimal dissimilarity to other members of the
cluster). As a result, k-means is more sensitive to outliers, but the centroids have
more statistical meaning [Ber06].
Both algorithms begin by selecting a random set of k centers. Based on the
centers, k clusters are computed. Next, non-centers are swapped with the centers
and new clusters are computed. The centers that yield the best clusters (minimal
average distance) are chosen. This repeats until convergence has been reached.
One of the difficulties with k-means and k-medoids is in choosing an appropriate
value for k. Often various values are chosen until optimal cluster quality is achieved.
Cluster quality can be determined by a metric called a silhouette, which for one cluster
data point, i is defined as:
s(i) =
b(i)− a(i)
max( a(i), b(i) )
(2)
where a(i) is the average dissimilarity of i to the other points in its cluster, and b(i) is
the lowest average dissimilarity of i to the other points in any other cluster [Rou87].
If s(i) is close to 1, this implies that the data point is in the correct cluster. If
s(i) is close to −1, this implies that the data point should be in the neighboring
cluster. Finally, a value near 0 indicates a weak correlation to either cluster. s(i) is
then calculated for every data point in order to measure if the appropriate number
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of clusters are representing the data. These values can be plotted for visual analysis
or simply used to generate a mean silhouette [Rou87].
Information Bottleneck. Unlike the previous clustering algorithms, the
Information Bottleneck method uses data probabilities instead of a distance matrix
[TPB99]. This method attempts to find the ideal tradeoff between accuracy and
complexity by using a joint probability distribution between a set of random variables
(X) and a set of related observed variables (Y ). Essentially, the algorithm determines
what information from X can predict the maximum amount of information from Y .
This has a corollary to rate-distortion theory in which X maps to a set of code words,
X̃, and X̃ maps to Y .
Non-negative matrix factorization. Briefly, non-negative matrix factor-
ization (NMF) is a method of clustering by factoring a matrix into two matrices
with no negative values [SD05]. Solving this problem, however, is NP-complete. One
method for accomplishing this in a time efficient manner is the alternating least
squares approach. The least squares approach essentially involves solving a set of
linear equations. Constraining one or both of the factored matrices is required for
solving in a time-efficient manner.
2.2.7.2 Alignment.
The primary alignment algorithms related to the material in this research are
Smith-Waterman [SW81], Needleman-Wunsch [NW70], and a progressive multiple
sequence alignment algorithm. The first two algorithms efficiently align only pairs of
sequences. Both Needleman-Wunsch and Smith-Waterman attempt to determine an
optimal alignment based upon matches, mismatches, and gaps. They accomplish this
efficiently using a technique called dynamic programming.
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Dynamic programming is a technique that breaks up a problem into overlapping
sub-problems, and iteratively builds up solutions to larger sub-problems using prior
computations [KT06]. The sub-problem solutions are typically stored in matrices.
Once the overall optimal solution is found, a trace-back through the solution matrix
can be used to identify the steps to achieve the desired solution.
Needleman-Wunsch is considered a global alignment algorithm in that it aligns
two sequences from beginning to end [NW70]. An example of an alignment for the
strings CTACCG and TACATG is given in Figure 12. The figure shows two gaps
denoted by a dark gray box with a ‘-’, and one mismatch at (x5, y4) denoted by
a blue highlighted box.
Figure 12. An example sequence alignment for two strings X and Y [KT06]
The alignment is performed by optimizing a total score based upon individual
matches, mismatches, and gaps [NW70]. Algorithm 1 shows the steps to align two
sequences, X, and Y (x1x2 . . . xm, y1y2 . . . yn). M represents the matrix containing
the optimal solutions at each step. G denotes the gap penalty, and is thus a negative
number (or 0). Finally, S is the similarity matrix where each pair is given a similarity
score. In bioinformatics, similarity scores represent the mutation probability of a given
character in a sequence. A good similarity matrix will reduce the number of incorrect
gaps [Bed04a].
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Algorithm 1 Sequence Alignment [KT06]
function Sequence-Alignment(m,n, x1x2 . . . xm, y1y2 . . . yn, G, S)
for i = 0 to m do . Initialize solution matrix, M , with values
M [0, i] = iG . for one string compared to an empty string
end for
for j = 0 to n do
M [j, 0] = jG
end for
for i = 1 to m do . find the optimal score at each step
for j = 1 to n do
M [i, j] = max(S[xi, yj]+M [i−1, j−1], G+M [i−1, j], G+M [i, j−1])
end for
end for
return M [m,n]
end function
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The optimal score at each step is derived from considering three cases [KT06]:
Case 1 M matches (xi, yj):
• obtain similarity score for (xi, yj) and add to maximum score from aligning
two strings x1, x2 . . . xi−1 and y1, y2 . . . yj−1
Case 2 M leaves xi unmatched:
• pay gap for xi and add to maximum score from aligning x1, x2 . . . xi−1 and
y1, y2 . . . yj
Case 3 M leaves yj unmatched:
• pay gap for yj and add to maximum score from aligning x1, x2 . . . xi and
y1, y2 . . . yj−1
It is important to note the similarity scores are the inverse of distance scores.
Therefore, another way to realize this algorithm is to minimize distance (mismatch
and gap penalties) between two strings [KT06]. Finally, once an optimal solution
is obtained, a trace-back through the solution matrix will yield the optimal global
alignment.
Figure 13 shows an example solution matrix for aligning two HTTP GET requests.
In this example, G = 0 and S values are 1 for a match and 0 for mismatch.
As can be seen in Figure 13, the optimal alignment score is 0xE. The highlighted
cells correspond to the path that a trace-back would follow. Horizontal and vertical
shifts insert gaps into the alignment. Figure 14 shows the alignment solution after
the trace-back through the solution matrix.
Smith-Waterman. The other alignment algorithm, Smith-Waterman, is
considered a local sequence alignment algorithm in that it is used to identify highly
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Figure 13. Example Needleman-Wunsch solution matrix [Bed04a]
Figure 14. Alignment obtained from trace-back of previous solution matrix [Bed04a]
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similar subsequences within a pair of sequences [SW81]. It is simply a variation of the
Needleman-Wunsch algorithm where any negative scoring cells are set to 0 and the
trace-back stops at the occurrence of a cell with a value of 0. Note, that the simplified
HTTP example shown previously would yield the same results with Smith-Waterman
as Needleman-Wunsch. However, if the gap or mismatch penalties were not 0, then
the two algorithms would yield different solution matrices.
Multiple Sequence Alignment. While Needleman-Wunsch is an efficient
algorithm for aligning two sequences, it is not efficient for aligning multiple sequences.
In fact, if a large number of N sequences of length L were aligned, then deriving the
solution would involve traversing a hypercube. This solution is NP-complete and
O(LN) time [WJ94, Bed04a]. However, a number of heuristics have been developed
that can estimate the optimal solution in a time-efficient manner. The heuristic of
most interest for this research is the progressive technique often called the hierarchi-
cal method. This technique first creates a binary guide tree of pairwise alignments
using a technique such as UPGMA. Then the MSA solution is gradually built up
by globally aligning the most similar sequences and ending with the most distantly
related sequences. After the end of each stage, the aligned string becomes the ref-
erence to align the next sequence. Care must be taken when using this method to
ensure that the sequences are not too divergent, because any errors (i.e., gaps) in one
stage’s alignment are propagated throughout the rest of the MSA [Bed04a]. This is
a tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy. Another heuristic for performing MSA
involves using Hidden Markov Models described next.
2.2.7.3 Markov models.
Markov Chains represent finite random processes where a future state depends
only on the present state [WBC10]. The probabilities of the state transitions are speci-
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fied in a transition matrix. Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) are Markov Chains which
include unknown internal states that can only be inferred by observation [Rab89].
That is, the probability of a given hidden state (and the probability of a given out-
put) can be determined. In addition to the state transition matrix, HMMs have a
symbol emission matrix which yields the probability distribution of outputs for a given
state. One of the challenges with using HMMs lie in choosing appropriate model pa-
rameters such as the number of states and number of distinct observations per state.
Additional algorithms such as Baum-Welch can be employed to find optimal param-
eters [WBC10]. Figure 15 shows an example of a HMM which could account for the
results of a hidden coin toss experiment. In this experiment, described in [Rab89],
it is unknown how many coins were tossed to yield a series of given heads or tail
observations.
Figure 15. Two-coin Hidden Markov Model for hidden coin toss experiment [Rab89]
2.2.7.4 Other algorithms.
This final algorithm section includes common algorithms that are relevant to this
research, but are not necessarily common to reverse engineering protocols.
Weighted interval scheduling is yet another common dynamic programming
algorithm. The algorithm finds the subset of non-overlapping jobs that yield a max-
imal weight [KT06]. Each job, j, is assigned a starting time (s), a finish time (f),
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and a value (v). The basis for the algorithm hinges on computing p-indexes. After
the jobs are sorted by finish times, p(j) corresponds to the largest job index, i < j,
where job i is compatible with job j [KT06]. Figure 16 shows an example of eight
jobs sorted by finish times. In this example, p(7) = 3 and p(3) = 0.
Figure 16. Example schedule (highlighted blue) determined by Weighted Interval
Scheduling [KT06]
The algorithm then simply consists of finding the optimal set of binary choices
[KT06]:
Case 1 M selects job j
• M = vj + M [p(j)]
Case 2 M does not select job j
• M = M [j − 1]
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code to compute a solution for the weighted interval
scheduling problem. Algorithm 3 then shows how to trace-back through the solution
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matrix in order to derive a schedule. In the previous example shown in Figure 16, the
optimal schedule (highlighted in blue) yields a total weight of 10. This assumes each
job’s value is equivalent to its length. In the general case, values can be arbitrarily
assigned.
Algorithm 2 Weighted Interval Scheduling (bottom-up approach) [KT06]
Input: n, s1, . . . , sn, f1, . . . , fn, v1, . . . , vn
Sort jobs by finish times so that f1 ≤ f2 ≤ . . . ≤ fn.
Compute p(1), p(2), . . . , p(n)
function Iterative-Compute-Opt
M [0] = 0
for j = 1 to n do
M [j] = max(vj + M [p(j)], M [j − 1])
end for
end function
2.3 Related Research
2.3.1 Manually configured ICS honeypots.
Several ICS honeypot projects have been created in the past. Most either required
real PLCs to act as HI honeypots, or required substantial effort in order to create
believable emulators.
Digital Bond provides a SCADA honeynet at http://www.digitalbond.com/tools/
scada-honeynet/. Their system uses a virtual Honeywall instance (described in Sec-
tion 2.2.6.1) as the gateway to their honeypot network. Honeyd provides LI SCADA
honeypots with File Transfer Protocol (FTP), HTTP, and Modbus services. Alter-
natively, a real PLC can be employed.
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Algorithm 3 Weighted Interval Scheduling Find Solution [KT06]
function Find-Solution(j)
Iterative-Compute-Opt
Find-Solution(n)
if j = 0 then
output nothing
else if (vj + M [p(j)] > M [j − 1]) then
print j
Find-Solution(p(j))
else
Find-Solution(j − 1)
end if
end function
Next, as previously discussed in Section 2.2.4, Kyle Wilhoit deployed ICS honey-
pots at various worldwide locations [Wil13b, Wil13a]. The first experiment included
a Dell server with PLC web server software to act as an HMI, a real ‘Nano-10’ PLC
web server to mimic a temperature controller, and a Honeyd VM deployed on Ama-
zon Cloud [Wil13b]. The Honeyd VM was made to look like a PLC with HTTP,
FTP, and Modbus interfaces. The second experiment had a similar set of services,
but web pages were updated with localized text [Wil13a]. Additionally, the Browser
Exploitation Framework was used to aid in attribution by injecting active scripts
into attacker’s machines who attempted to access a “secured” web page. The scripts
provided remote identification and other features.
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ICS honeypots have also been implemented on embedded hardware. In 2013
Jaromin emulated a Koyo DirectLOGIC 405 PLC on a Gumstix single board computer
with an embedded distribution of Linux called Angstrom [Jar82]. The honeypot
behavior was implemented by creating custom firewall rules, modifying TCP settings,
and creating Python service scripts. HTTP and Modbus were implemented.
Another researcher created a honeypot to mimic a Siemens Simatic 300 using
a customized Ubuntu VM [BJM+14]. The project, called CryPLH, implemented
HTTP, HTTP Secure (HTTPS), Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP),
and Siemens’ alternate TCP implementation called ISO-TSAP. As with the previ-
ously described project, emulator behavior was implemented by using custom firewall
rules and TCP settings. MiniServer was installed to serve HTTP, and Nginx was
installed to provide HTTPS. Some web pages, such as the login page, were manu-
ally edited. The SNMP agent used information from /proc and records previously
extracted from a real PLC. Finally ISO-TSAP was implemented in Python.
The last project of interest is an open-source project called Conpot located at
http://conpot.org/. They have released service scripts that can be used to implement
Modbus and SNMP. By default, Conpot emulates a Siemens SIMATIC S7-200 PLC
with an input/output module and a CP 443-1 (communications module).
2.3.2 Dynamic honeynets.
There are several honeypot projects that are automatically configured, but they
only automatically configure the network and transport layers. The application layer
traffic, if handled, is done by pre-configured VMs. Their primary purpose, then, is to
essentially create a dynamic honeynet that can cover large address spaces and handle
traffic from network scanning tools.
One project, for example, aimed to capture IPv6 address scans [KOY+12]. It
relied on the assumption that media access control (MAC) addresses are often used
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to generate IPv6 addresses. When an adversary scans for a particular IPv6 address,
the network router will send out neighbor solicitation (NS) messages to find out which
local machine has that address. The honeypot system then extracts the MAC from
the NS and selects a pre-configured VM whose vendor and model matches the MAC.
The corresponding requested addresses are then configured on the VM via a secure
shell (SSH), and the machine sends out a neighbor advertisement (NA) to respond to
the router’s original request.
The remaining dynamic honeynet research all use Honeyd for their emulation, so
the auto-configuration then just requires automatic handling of the Honeyd configura-
tion files. The primary difference between the various implementations is based upon
whether they use active sniffing, passive sniffing, or a combination of the two in order
to obtain configuration information. Active sniffing injects packets into the network
in order to solicit a response, so those methods can usually obtain information faster.
Passive methods, on the other hand, listen only and are thus more stealthy.
As an example, Hieb used p0f and tcpdump for passively detecting Operating
Systems (OSs) and ports in order to combine a dynamic honeynet with Snort IDS
[Hie04]. Hecker, Nance, and Hay, instead used Nmap to actively obtain information
[HNH06]. The honeynet developed by Kuwatly, Sraj, Masri, and Artail used both
methods interchangeably [KSAMA04].
This concept was later extended by Hecker and Hay’s dynamic honeynet that
defined various noise factor levels [HH13]. Five increasingly active levels were defined
based on the combination of tools used for sniffing. At the lowest level, only p0f
and tcpdump were to be used. Xprobe2 was then additionally employed with
increasingly aggressive options for the next two levels in order to obtain OS and port
information, respectively. At the medium-high setting Nmap was used alone. Finally,
Nmap and xprobe2 were used together for the highest noise factor level. All of the
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noise factor levels were tested, and it was discovered that the active scanning tools
often degraded the p0f’s performance. Finally, another unique feature of Hecker
and Hay’s research is that they used Extensible Markup Language (XML) files for
representing honeypot configuration information.
XML is a powerful markup language because it provides a standard format for
various software to interpret information. This is the reason why Vollmer and Manic
used XML in their dynamic ICS honeynet [VM14]. Instead of using the tools men-
tioned previously, their research used Ettercap to passively scan the network and
generate XML output files. This allowed them to automatically identify each de-
vice’s OS, ports, and MAC address. The identified ports were matched up against
against common OS ports in order to select the most probable OS version for their
VM configuration. The MAC address could also be used to select the OS. Next, by
identifying the hardware vendor from the MAC, a common set of ports, protocols,
and services could be selected for the honeypot configuration. Future changes to the
network configuration could be detected by the differences in the XML files. The
required VM changes would then be done dynamically using Honeyd’s Honeydctl
interface. This dynamic ICS honeynet was later integrated into Vollmer, Manic, and
Linda’s Automatic Intelligent Cyber-Sensor (AICS) [VML14].
The AICS combined a fuzzy logic driven IDS with the dynamic honeynet described
previously [VML14]. The components were integrated by a two-tier communication
scheme. External communication was done using XML messages over HTTPS, while
internal communication was accomplished via interprocess communication (D-Bus).
This communication scheme provided a modular design where sensor components
would be isolated from direct network contact with other devices. By shadowing an
existing ICS network, the honeynet provided a large attack surface to attract anoma-
lous traffic. Finally, the IDS’s sensitivity level would automatically adjust based upon
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traffic trends. This tightly integrated hybrid network sensor system identified 99.9%
of anomalous packets generated during experimentation.
2.3.3 Automatically configured emulators using protocol knowledge.
While the research in Section 2.3.2 focused on dynamically instantiating hon-
eynets, this group of research dynamically creates application layer emulators based
on a priori protocol knowledge. For example, Jiang and Xu developed a system of
“catering” honeypots called BAIT-TRAP [JX04]. Essentially, a set of desired services
was determined based upon destination ports found in network traffic. A template
was then selected from a set of VM images. Additional Linux services could be
provided automatically using package managers.
Another project called Adaptive Honeypot Alternative (AHA) created a self-
learning SSH honeypot [WSED11]. AHA used reinforcement learning techniques,
combined with an abstract state machine and actions such as command substitution,
in order to maximize attacker interaction.
Next, Chowdhary, Tongaonkar, and Chiueh used a modified version of classical
data mining techniques they called “service mining” in order to learn FTP [CTC04].
Their approach requires an initial database of protocol keywords and arguments.
Then, collected network traces are broken down into sets of interaction that are
correlated to the keywords.
Another text-based protocol emulator was developed in 2014 by Fink for ICS
honeypot research [Fin90]. The web interface of a Koyo DirectLogic 405 PLC was
emulated, along with partial emulation of TCP behavior. Wget was used to auto-
matically mirror the PLC’s web site while capturing the traffic using tcpdump. To
partially emulate transport layer behavior, several TCP parameters such as time to
live (TTL), timestamps, and window scaling were extracted from the packet capture
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and exported to the appropriate Linux kernel interfaces. Finally, during replay a
client request dictionary was used to select the appropriate HTTP response header.
The combined header and corresponding HTML were then sent back to the client via
a Python web server.
ICS emulators have also been used previously for firmware verification. In 2012
McMinn created a tool to verify Allen-Bradley PLC firmware [McM00]. This was done
by first capturing pairs of firmware upload traffic. Each reference pair of captured
bytes were then lined up and compared in order to identify stateful protocol fields.
This process was aided by a set of heuristics based on knowledge of the DF1 protocol.
After the emulator was trained, firmware could then be validated by checking future
upload traces against the trained set in order to identify any significant differences.
A similar technique has also been used to verify network traffic. In 2014 researchers
developed network dialog difference measures that are used for HTTP traffic cluster-
ing [RCHJ14]. Traffic clustering, like other forms of clustering, determines what
objects (messages in this case) belong to what group. As such they are very useful
for generating IDS signatures. The distance measures were created by comparing the
request-response pairs (RRPs) between two traces. Similarity scores were computed
based on same request type, URL path, content length, and other HTTP protocol
fields. The messages were then aligned by treating the trace pair as a weighted
bipartite graph where the goal is to maximize weight (similarity) through unique as-
signments. Total dialog similarity was then computed by dividing the total similarity
weight by the number of nodes.
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2.3.4 Reverse engineering protocols.
2.3.4.1 Overview.
As previously discussed in Section 2.2.7, reverse engineering protocols involves in-
ferring message formats and the proper order in which those messages can be used (a
state machine). It is important to note, however, that the degree to which this must
be done depends on how the output will be used. Pure protocol reverse engineering
programs attempt to define a protocol well enough to create a packet dissector, while
honeypots only need to understand a protocol well enough to accurately mimic pre-
vious conversations [BGH14]. Thus, the computational complexity and/or number of
traces required for honeypots could potentially be less than those of pure reversing
programs.
What follows is a survey of 21 tools that reverse engineer protocols. Nearly all
of them use network traces to infer formats, but many of them also use dynamic
taint analysis (DTA) of execution traces described in Section 2.2.6.1. The tools use
various methods for aligning (by byte, token, or n-gram probability) and clustering
(positional, distance, action, etc) messages. In Chapter III it is shown how the
techniques used by some of these tools can be leveraged to create a flexible framework
for developing protocol-agnostic honeypots.
2.3.4.2 Reversing engineering protocols using program binaries.
In 2006 the research team behind Replayer showed how the traffic replay problem
could be represented concisely as a set of solvable equations [NBFS06]. Solving them
required a program execution trace along with assembly code of the network program.
Additionally, the client’s initial state must be known either through direct knowledge
or by inference of traffic session fields. Unfortunately, the derived solutions (i.e.,
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server responses) could not be guaranteed to always be found. Additional constraints
also have to be enforced to ensure that the solution has correct static fields.
The remaining tools all use some form of DTA in order to reverse engineer proto-
cols. For instance, a typical method for finding field delimiters is to look for program
operations that compare a tainted input byte with an untainted value. Similarly, field
keywords can be inferred by finding comparisons of a string of tainted bytes against
a string of untainted bytes. Bytes that lead to file accesses are probably filenames.
Finally, finding length fields involves searching for comparisons that terminate loops,
and padding can be detected by identifying unused bytes.
Polyglot is the first published tool to use DTA techniques such as above [CYLS07].
A year later AutoFormat improved on those techniques by identifying hierarchical
message formats [LJXZ08]. The key insight was that bytes being used in the same
execution context (e.g., function) are most likely a part of the same field. However,
this does not account for functions that parse multiple fields at a time. Concurrently,
other research developed DTA techniques fine grained enough to produce a parsing
grammar [WCKK08]. Hierarchical delimiters were discovered and then extended byte
by byte to identify multiple byte delimiters (e.g. ‘\r\n’). Additionally, bytes that
were found in both client requests and server responses were semantically linked.
Finally, messages across the trace were correlated by aligning them with Needleman-
Wunsch (weights 1 for a match, -1 for a mismatch and gap). This allowed messages
to be generalized using regular expressions.
In 2009 the same research team created Prospex that went one step further by
inferring a message format and SM [CWKK09]. In this work, distance matrices were
created using various metrics. First Needleman-Wunsch scores were calculated on
aligned fields. Next a Jaccard index (intersection of similar elements divided by union
of similar elements) was calculated on five execution metrics: system, function, and
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library calls, process activity, and executed instruction addresses. These similarity
scores were then used to cluster via PAM. Finally, the SM, which was initially created
in the same order as seen in the traces, was minimized by recognizing patterns in their
sequences and using the Exbar algorithm to merge equivalent states.
Researchers have also developed tools to reverse encrypted protocols. ReFor-
mat [WJC+09] and Dispatcher [CPKS09, CS13] both read encrypted data while it is
unencrypted in memory buffers. Dispatcher is able to handle more complex encryp-
tion schemes, however [CS13]. Additionally, Dispatcher is unique in that it does not
use any network traces. Instead, it derives message fields by discovering how they
are divided into various memory buffers [CPKS09, CS13]. This is accomplished first
by monitoring socket calls to divide execution traces into a set of messages. The
message fields are then correlated to the buffers that make up the network buffer.
Finally, DTA is used to determine the semantic meaning of the fields and how they
link between client and server messages.
The last reversing program that uses application binaries is Tupni [CPC+08],
which uses DTA along with the tokenization and recursive clustering techniques of
Discoverer (described in the next section).
2.3.4.3 Reversing engineering protocols using only network traces.
One of the first attempts at protocol reverse engineering using network traces was
the work by Beddoe in 2004 [Bed04a]. Protocol Informatics (PI) used UPGMA clus-
tering based on Smith-Waterman distance matrices in order to create guide trees for
Needleman-Wunsch MSA. Consensus statistics (most common byte, most common
data type, mutation rate) were then performed on each aligned byte in order to infer
message formats.
While PI’s inferred message formats provide only basic semantic meaning, Script-
Gen extended them using Region Analysis in order to create protocol-agnostic hon-
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eypot scripts for Honeyd [LMD05]. ScriptGen first builds an initial finite state ma-
chine (FSM) by creating a branch for every session from a packet capture. This tree
is then generalized by using PI to cluster based on local alignment scores and regional
mutation rates. Clusters are byte-aligned via MSA and regular expressions are cre-
ated to match against incoming client requests during replay. The second iteration of
ScriptGen included improved dependency handling between messages (i.e., sessions
IDs) and between sessions [LDM06]. Additionally, proxy support was added to allow
ScriptGen to incrementally update itself based upon responses from real devices.
Roleplayer is another protocol-agnostic honeypot that uses some of the algorithms
from PI [CPWK06]. Specifically, Needleman-Wunsch is used (weights: 1 for match
and -1 for gap) to align a pair of sequences by blocks and find differences. The blocks
are created by splitting sequences up by tokens of found end-point addresses and
known arguments. A set of heuristics based on common protocol idioms are used to
determine if certain blocks contain length fields or cookies. Smith-Waterman is used
during replay to decide when received data consists of a complete message. The main
drawback to Roleplayer’s approach is that it can handle only one scripted session at
a time, and the client must not deviate at all from that scripted session.
Next, Advanced Protocol Reversing Tool (APRT) combines some of the techniques
from both ScriptGen and Roleplayer [PHDW12]. Similar to ScriptGen, APRT also
uses PI’s MSA to align sequences. Unlike ScriptGen’s byte alignments, APRT aligns
by ASCII and binary blocks to make the process more efficient. Field identification
is then determined by successive bytes with similar variability coefficients (number
ASCII bytes divided by number sequences). Finally, length and other fields are
inferred using Roleplayer’s heuristics.
Other research aligns sequences based upon tokens. For instance, Discoverer cre-
ates tokens out of common delimiters (e.g., ‘SPC’ and ‘TAB’) and clusters based on the
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order of tokens [CKW07]. Similar message formats are then merged after recursively
refining length and other fields using Roleplayer’s heuristics. Certain discriminating
tokens are used to separate formats. ReverX is another example that uses delimiters
in order to infer message formats [ANV11]. However, it also builds a SM while pars-
ing a network trace and later generalizes it using transition frequencies. Since both
Discoverer and ReverX use text delimiters, their approaches are most effective for
text-based protocols.
Another group of research uses more probabilistic methods in order to reverse
protocols. All of these use n-grams, which are simply permutations of byte sequences
of n length. Researchers at Johns Hopkins University, for instance, developed a
LI web honeypot using n-gram probabilities of various space, text, and binary to-
kens [SMM+08]. k-medoids were used to cluster and a Markov model was generated
using probabilistic simulations. Additionally, global message dependencies were de-
termined by Needleman-Wunsch aligning client messages to their respective server
responses. Bytes that were the same in 80% or more of messages were globally linked
across all message pairs.
Next, another pair of projects gives the user a choice between using tokens and
n-grams (optimal for text or binary protocols, respectively) rather than combining
them [KKR11, KGKR12]. Frequency distributions are then calculated and the ex-
tremes are filtered out. Keywords will low variability are likely fixed fields, and key-
words with high variability are likely random data. The reduced set is then clustered
via NMF [KKR11]. This work was extended in the open-source Protocol Inspection
and State Machine Analysis (PRISMA) project [KGKR12]. PRISMA added a hon-
eypot replayer, performed additional clustering by keyword order, and inferred a SM.
The SM was created by building a Markov model based on clustered transition se-
quences and then reducing it to a HMM by aligning messages with equivalent states
and number of tokens.
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Veritas also uses tokens and n-grams [WZY+11]. It initially filters based on the
sample distances of an empirical distribution function. Then a Jaccard index is used
as distance input into PAM for clustering. Next, the order of the states and their
transition probabilities infer an initial SM which is then minimized.
The final probabilistic protocol reverser is ProDecoder [WYS+12]. It is fully auto-
mated and uses n-gram frequency distributions as input to a Gibbs sampling (Markov
chain simulation) algorithm to identify keywords. Message clustering is performed us-
ing the Information Bottleneck method, and then MSA is performed on the clusters
to identify fields.
In addition to the previous methods, genetic programming has been used for
protocol reversing [LBZH13]. Unfortunately, NimsGP requires a protocol-specific
instruction set in order to properly minimize the SM.
Finally, the open-source Netzob infers message formats and state machines by
using a variety of the previous techniques plus some unique ones [BGH14]. For
inferring message formats Netzob first requires that the input trace have different
tasks identified. This is either done manually or by using execution monitoring. The
sessions are then split into a series of tasks, and messages with no associated task
of interest are used to filter out background noise. Next, messages are tokenized
and clustered using methods similar to Discover, and contextual information (IP
addresses, etc) is extracted from the trace. Every half-byte of the tokenized message
sequences are tagged to identify semantics. These tags are used to weight scores
in extended forms of Needleman-Wunsch and UPGMA. Half-bytes with the same
value and tags are then merged. Finally, linear and non-linear dependencies are
exhaustively determined.
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2.3.4.4 Summary.
In summary, there are a variety of techniques for reverse engineering protocols.
Most of them use network traces, but many of them also use DTA on application
binaries. Using binaries provides more accurate measures for reversing the protocol,
but protocol application binaries are not always available. Often clients and servers
also use different versions. Trace-based approaches, on the other hand, have the
limitation that their inference is limited by the quality of the traces. Thus, long
or multiple traces are often required. This is particularly true of the methods that
rely on statistics (e.g., n-grams) to identify important keywords. Finally, it has been
shown that there are a variety of clustering and alignment techniques that are used
at varying levels of abstraction (bytes, tokens, blocks, messages, and tasks).
2.3.5 Putting it all together: Hybrid honeypots using smart replay.
This final section of related research gives a brief overview of advanced hybrid
honeypots that integrate protocol-agnostic replay with proxying and self-training.
All of them use either Roleplayer or ScriptGen for replaying protocols in order to
create a malware analysis framework.
GQ was the first advanced hybrid honeypot, and it was originally designed for
tracking worm propagation [CPW06]. GQ uses Roleplayer for its LI replay, and its
architecture uses a central gateway to create a virtual infected machine network of
inmates. VMs are managed using a VM monitor. As in the other examples from
Section 2.2.6.4, traffic forwarding and other manipulations (filtering outgoing connec-
tions, etc) are done by the gateway. A newer iteration provided better containment
policies and allowed for handling other types of malware [KWK+11].
Unlike GQ’s centralized architecture, SGNET provides a distributed deployment
that handles worms and server-based code injection attacks [LD08]. SGNET uses
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ScriptGen as its LI replayer, and its architecture is similar to that of Honeybrid de-
scribed in Section 2.2.6.4. In particular, SGNET uses different backend honeypots
for malware handling. Argos collects and contains malware samples or forwards code
injection attacks to the exploit modes in nepenthes. ScriptGen acts as a general vul-
nerability module for nepenthes, and it uses the traffic generated by Argos to update
its configuration. Additionally, SGNET integrates with Anubis and VirusTotal for
malware analysis. Finally, a unique feature of SGNET is that its distributed architec-
ture allows partners around the world to deploy sensors using a common VM image.
Traffic found by the sensors are used to update the FSMs of other distributed nodes.
Variations of SGNET have also been used in two other advanced hybrid honey-
pots [GLB12]. Mozzie extended the containment capabilities of SGNET by using
ScripGen to model both sides of a malware conversation. This way command and
control traffic, for instance, would not have to leave the network in order to allow
for full exploitation. Instead, ScriptGen is used to model the victim in one virtual
instance and the master controller in another virtual instance. Finally, AWESOME,
which stands for Automated Web Emulation for Secure Operation of a Malware-
Analysis Environment, uses ScriptGen to power its replay [FB13]. Like the other
projects, Argos is used for malware collection. AWESOME, however, uses external
script handlers from Honeyd and Nitro for malware analysis.
2.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter shows that the United States depends on ICS for providing its Crit-
ical Infrastructure. However the devices, such as PLCs, that make up these control
systems are vulnerable by design. In order to defend them from adversaries a new
state-based paradigm must be employed along with advanced network sensors using
honeypots.
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Honeypots have many variations that can cater to most security needs. By using
a creative mix of LI and HI honeypots a scalable, yet high-fidelty honeynet can be
created. Additionally, tools such as Honeyd can be used to rapidly deploy dynamic
honeynets. However, emulating proprietary protocols used by PLC vendors is difficult
and prevents researchers from being able to quickly develop effective ICS honeypots.
Protocol reverse engineering techniques have been shown to be effective in auto-
matically learning and emulating many protocols. GQ and SGNET makes use of these
technologies in order to deploy advanced hybrid honeypots for catching malware.
Unfortunately these tools have not been publicly released, nor have their effective-
ness in ICS networks been published. Thus, there is a need to develop an open-source
protocol-agnostic honeypot that is proven to be effective with ICS protocols. The
design of this honeypot discussed in Chapter III requires leveraging the right combi-
nation of protocol reverse engineering techniques discussed in this chapter.
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III. Framework Design
3.1 Overview
This chapter provides a detailed account of the framework design for automatically
configuring PLC emulation. The framework design parameters require the resultant
product to be accurate, flexible, and efficient. After careful consideration of the
various protocol reverse engineering techniques discussed in the previous chapter, a
design based on ScriptGen is selected. Other previously discussed techniques are also
used, along with several novel contributions of this research. These contributions
include a backtracking algorithm that can handle unknown transitions and enables
session looping, a default response mechanism, and a set of algorithms (inspired by
ScriptGen) to determine and filter protocol dependencies.
The resultant ScriptGenE Framework includes several modular components that
can be used to generate, manipulate, replay, and assess protocol FSMs.
3.2 Design Parameters
The following are the design parameters (organized by category) that were con-
sidered while creating the framework:
Accuracy:
1. Emulator produces traffic that can fool industry standard tools for inter-
acting with PLCs (e.g., RSLogix)
2. Application layer responses are not statistically different than real PLC
responses for a given conversation/task
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Flexibility:
1. Protocol-agnostic (No assumptions about protocol type e.g., text, binary,
mixed)
2. Able to provide repeated patterns of short responses for a session of indef-
inite length in order to emulate ICS device polling
3. Able to provide a response that is acceptable by the client even when the
current request is unknown or out of order according to the replay script
4. Replay as stand alone or with Honeyd integration
5. Effective as stand alone or future integration in hybrid honeypot
6. Extensible design allows for integrating future enhancements
Efficiency:
1. Configuration and emulation can be automated
2. Requires few traces (1-7) to produce an accurate emulator
3. Can build emulation script within reasonable amount of time (five minutes)
3.3 Technique Suitability Evaluation
Next, the various protocol reverse engineering tools and techniques discussed
from the previous chapter are considered. Netzob’s published comparison study
of Automatic Semantics-aware Analysis of Network Payloads (ASAP), Discoverer,
ScriptGen, and Netzob is also considered [BGH14]. While the study only includes a
limited number of tools, the selection does cover different technique classes (proba-
bilistic, delimiters, positional clustered and byte-aligned).
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First, in the interest of flexibility and requiring complete automation, approaches
only requiring network traces are considered. Requiring a binary in order to perform
DTA would limit the tools to only be able to learn directed (i.e., manual) tasks.
Second, approaches that depend primarily on probabilistic methods are removed
from consideration since they require a significant number of traces to be accurate.
Additionally, the Netzob team’s findings show that approaches that rely only on
statistical analysis of n-grams identify less than 20% of the correct message for-
mats [BGH14]. PRISMA and ASAP also have the issue that the keyword identi-
fication approach (n-gram or token) and the clustering approach must be manually
selected (Some heuristics, however, may be able to do this automatically).
Third, approaches using delimiters are only effective when the protocols contain
the delimiters. Discoverer, for example, makes assumptions about text delimiters that
would not be appropriate for binary protocols. Higher level tokens would potentially
be useful, but they would have to be carefully defined so as to not only benefit
reversing text-based protocols. At a higher level of abstraction, identifying fields by
binary or ASCII blocks as APRT did is only beneficial for mixed protocols [PHDW12].
Regarding APRT, it is unclear how fields would be identified for binary protocols since
identification depends on differing ratios of ASCII bytes between aligned bytes.
PI and Netzob are particularly attractive since they are both open-source [Bed04b,
BGH13]. Both have been tested for suitability. PI requires careful trace filtering and
a lot of packets in order to infer a good enough message format for replay. Netzob pro-
vides a graphical user interface (GUI) to select different methods to parse sequences.
It will also replay based on client inputs once a SM has been created. Overall, Netzob
is determined to be good for “semi-automatic” protocol reverse engineering, but is
not suitable in its current form for automatic learning and replay.
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Roleplayer and ScriptGen, however, stand out from the other projects since they
have been used in hybrid honeypots as described in Section 2.3.5. Neither project
can handle unknown transitions during replay without the help of a proxy. Role-
player is particularly limited in that it can only emulate one task (i.e., script) at a
time. ScriptGen cannot dynamically update environmental information, and it re-
quires more traces than Roleplayer due to the statistical variety (regional mutation
rates) required for its microclustering. In the Netzob team’s analysis ScriptGen is
found to be very accurate, but not concise [BGH14]. Accuracy is aided by the fact
the messages are positionally clustered, but this is also the reason why it does not
concisely represent a protocol. Messages arriving in a different order lead to new
transitions. However, concisely representing a protocol is not crucial for a honeypot,
while accuracy is important.
The selected solution for this research is to use a mix of techniques from ScriptGen
and Roleplayer, while introducing some new novel concepts to fill the requirement
gaps. As such, the chosen design is primarily based on ScriptGen. In reference to
this, the framework is named ScriptGenE (pronounced ‘script genie’), which stands
for ‘ScriptGen Enhanced’. Additionally, some code from PI is reused (alignment and
phylogenetic tree creating algorithms). In order to clearly delineate PI and ScriptGen
from the current design, a more in depth introduction is provided.
3.4 Protocol Informatics In-depth
The PI Framework provides a set of distance functions (entropic, pairwise, and
local alignment), alignment functions (Smith-Waterman, Needleman-Wunsch, and
MSA), and phylogenetic tree creation via UPGMA clustering. The framework was
developed in Python/Pyrex (C extensions to Python similar to Cython).
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The provided main script takes a packet capture as input, and it outputs byte
sequences representing each message cluster. First, PI parses all packets from an input
trace and creates distance matrices using Smith-Waterman (weights 2 for match, -1
for mismatch, and -2 for gaps). These matrices are used to create guide trees using
UPGMA, which are then in turn used to perform MSA using Needleman-Wunsch
(weights 1 for a match and 0 for all else). Each cluster of aligned sequences is then
shown in a colorful output display.
An example of the output that PI provides for an aligned cluster is shown in
Figure 17. Each numbered line represents a different aligned sequence of hexadecimal
bytes. In the figure sequence labels can be seen on the far left, and the most common
data types (DTs) and mutation rates can be seen on the bottom two rows. Mutation
rates are defined as
# unique bytes
total bytes
(3)
The colors are based on the DT of each byte: ASCII values (‘AAA’) are colored
green, zeros (‘ZZZ’) are magenta, gaps (‘GGG’) are red, spaces (‘SSS’) are yellow,
and other bytes (‘BBB’) are white. In addition to what is shown in the figure, an
ungapped consensus is provided (guessed message format). Instead of listing each
byte as shown in Figure 17, the consensus sequence simply lists the most common
byte (MCB) for each byte or ‘???’ if there is not one. Any bytes where the MCB is
a gap are omitted from the consensus sequence.
3.5 ScriptGen In-depth
While PI’s inferred message formats provide only basic semantic meaning, Script-
Gen extends them using Region Analysis in order to create protocol-agnostic honey-
pot scripts for Honeyd [LMD05, LDM06]. ScriptGen accomplishes this in four main
parts.
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Figure 17. Message cluster output from PI
First, a packet capture is parsed and all TCP segments with message payloads
are stored in an array with TCP sequence numbers being used as the index [LMD05].
Using the sequence numbers handles out of order messages. Next, the array is used
to build an initial FSM where each edge label represents a client request and each
node label represents a server response. Consecutive message flows in one direction
are consolidated. Each TCP connection from the input trace represents a different
branch of the FSM, where the number of nodes in the branch is the number of server
messages in the session. All branches are initially connected at the root, forming a
simple tree.
The third step is where ScriptGen generalizes the FSM [LMD05]. In a breadth first
search (BFS) visit of the tree, each node’s outgoing edges are clustered/combined.
Each cluster then becomes a singular branch with the edge label being converted
to a regular expression that represents the group. The edge is also given a weight
equivalent to the number of sequences that make up the group. This serves to identify
the most frequent transitions in the FSM.
It should be noted that ScriptGen inherently clusters messages based upon their
position in a session since only a node’s outgoing edges are considered for clustering.
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This makes the resultant emulator more accurate since it will expect and mimic
sessions using the same order of messages that it has stored in its FSM. For example,
Figure 18 shows two sessions that would be seen as separate branches in the FSM.
The first session on the left side of the figure shows that the client sent two consecutive
messages which were responded to consecutively by the server. In the second session
on the right side of the figure, both the client and server send one message at a
time. In this example, even though the client and server each sent their message
in the same order, the messages are not in the same order from a third party’s
perspective. Furthermore, since ScriptGen consolidates consecutive message flows in
one direction, the consolidated message [cA, cB] would not be equivalent to message
[cA] or equivalent to message [cB].
cA, cB
sA, sB
cA
sA
cB
sB
Time Time
Figure 18. Sessions with different message order are not equivalent
In addition to the inherent positional clustering, ScriptGen uses two more rounds
of clustering. The first serves to group major classes of messages (e.g., GET requests),
while the second attempts to cluster based on specific types of messages (e.g., ‘GET
*.png’ versus ‘GET *.html’). The initial clustering, or macroclustering, is done
using PI [LMD05]. PI’s output is then used to perform Region Analysis. Regions
are defined as bytes with the same type, similar mutation rates, the same “kind”
of data, and the same gap presence [LMD05]. Additional clustering, described as
microclustering, is then done by creating a distance matrix based on region-wide byte
frequencies. The researchers’ insight is that frequent values probably have semantic
meaning. Next, as a result of microclustering, previous mutating regions become fixed
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regions. A regular expression is then generated that matches the order of regions and
their type (i.e., mutating or fixed).
Regions are also used to determine dependencies, or links, from client to server
messages within a session [LDM06]. This means that bytes from a client message are
duplicated by the server in its response. These intra-protocol links include fields such
as session IDs, cookies, etc. To identify the links, first a set of markers are identified
in the client messages. These significant fixed regions only have one occurrence in the
client message. All of the other bytes are checked for matches in the corresponding
server response. A minimum of two bytes are used when considering matches up to
the maximum size of the match.
Once links are identified, they are represented by a tuple consisting of the client
request ID, starting and ending markers, and the marker offsets [LDM06]. Represen-
tations of these links then replace corresponding content in the server response. Once
this is done for all of the server responses, the proposed messages are consolidated into
one proposal that represents the cluster. This is done by aligning the bytes as shown
in Figure 19 and picking the most frequent byte for every aligned byte. Any proposal
that does not have the most frequent byte for the currently evaluated aligned byte is
discarded from the proposal list. The chosen proposal (number 5 in Figure 19) must
be equivalent to at least one of the proposals.
ScriptGen also includes two features that are not implemented in this research.
First, ScriptGen detects another dependency type that Leita, Dacier, and Massicotte
called inter-protocol dependencies [LDM06]. Inter-protocol dependencies refer to links
between sessions such as a message in one session leading to an open port or other
action in another session (e.g., FTP). Inter-protocol links are identified using simple
heuristics based on the order of client and server interactions between groups of TCP
connections.
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Figure 19. Link consolidation [LDM06]
Second, ScriptGen’s newer iteration also has the ability to hand off a session to a
proxy if it does not know how to respond during replay. For details on this the reader
is referred to [LDM06].
Finally, it should be noted that ScriptGen’s replay script is intended to be used
only in Honeyd. The Python replay script sends responses by printing to stdout
and receives requests by reading stdin [LMD05].
3.6 The ScriptGenE Framework
3.6.1 Framework overview.
The ScriptGenE Framework, or simply ScriptGenE, is developed in Python and
consists of approximately 5,600 lines of code (not including third party libraries such
as PI). The primary functions of the framework are generating, manipulating, re-
playing, and assessing protocol trees (P-trees). Figure 20 shows an overview of how
the framework builds and replays P-trees. ScriptGenE.py builds P-trees by parsing
a set of input traces according to given build options. The generated P-tree is then
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imported by ScriptGenEreplay.py according to a set of replay options in order to em-
ulate the network responses given in the tree. P-trees are ScriptGenE’s FSM. Each
node or edge represents a server or client message, respectively. Several attributes
are embedded into these objects, some of which are described later.
ScriptGenE.py
Build P-trees
ScriptGenEreplay.py
Emulator 
(Replay P-trees)
Protocol
tree
ScriptGenE Framework
Set of traces
Build options Replay options
Figure 20. ScriptGenE Framework Overview
The ScriptGenE Framework includes other important scripts in addition to the
two previously mentioned. The primary ScriptGenE Framework files and their func-
tionality are:
ScriptGenE.py
• Primary script of the framework
• Parses packet capture (Pcap) files and builds message lists
• Builds initial and generalized protocol trees
• Outputs / logs report
– Conversation summaries
– Region Analysis output
– Link summaries
– P-tree build summary
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GeneralizeTree.py
• Takes initial tree (ScriptGenE.py intermediate output) and generalizes it
• Outputs / logs report (same as ScriptGenE.py)
CombineGtrees.py
• Combines trees at ROOT and merges ROOT attributes
ScriptGenEreplay.py
• A server that loads a protocol tree and replays messages based on how the
client messages it receives match edges in the tree
• Outputs progress
• Logs hexdump of client messages in INFO messages
clientReplay.py
• Replays client requests stored in a protocol tree by choosing random tran-
sitions along a path
• Replay can either stop after a tree leaf is reached or repeat from random
nodes until a keyboard interrupt is received
• Server responses are ignored
• Can be used to test protocol trees locally or against a real server
diffPcaps.py
• Finds the number of different bytes in consolidated messages between two
Pcap files and prints/logs those differences
• Differences in quantity or length of messages (not connections) are counted
as different bytes
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It should be noted that all of the ScriptGenE Framework scripts provide help
instructions when run with ‘-h’ or ‘--help’. Also included in the framework is a
gzipped build script folder for building a Honeyd package using the latest sources.
‘honeyd_Ubuntu_buildscript.tar.gz’ is the name of the gzipped tarball con-
taining the build script. In addition, several custom scripts are developed for running
experiments (discussed in Section 4.9.3). Finally, a few thirds party tools are also
used and included in the framework:
PI.py by Marshall Beddoe
Modified version of PI that provides same enhanced output as ScriptGenE
hexdump.py by Anatoly Techtonik
Returns or prints a hexdump of a given sequence
redemo.py by Donald Stufft
Regular expression test program with Tkinter GUI
The next two sections provide a detailed discussion of the protocol tree building
and replay scripts (ScriptGenE.py and ScriptGenEreplay.py, respectively).
3.6.2 ScriptGenE.py.
3.6.2.1 Overview.
ScriptGenE.py takes a set of input arguments including a list of Pcaps. These
Pcaps are all parsed to build a protocol tree for every connection. Environmental
links are found while building the connection trees. Next, all connection trees that
share the same port are combined into a port tree. These initial trees are exported as
Python pickle files in the chosen export directory. Optionally, a graphic of the tree
can be saved as well.
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Next, GeneralizeTree.py is called by ScriptGenE.py to generalize the trees. This is
done by first consolidating all edges that share the same data and parent node. After
the initial consolidation, the main consolidation phase clusters/combines all edges
that share a parent and are semantically equivalent. The combined edge data for the
consolidated edges is represented by a regular expression. Intra-protocol dependencies
and a default error message are found. Once this is done, the final trees are exported
as Python pickle files. These pickle files can then be imported by ScriptGenEreplay.py
or clientReplay.py for emulation.
3.6.2.2 Requirements.
First, ScriptGenE is developed in Linux and is intended to be used in Linux.
Additionally, several Python libraries are needed:
• python-numpy
• python-dpkt
• python-pcapy
• python-pydot
Networkx version 1.9.1 or later is also required. Networkx creates and manip-
ulates graphs in Python [HSS08]. It has been adapted in this research to create
protocol trees. At the time of this writing the Ubuntu package is out of date. Version
1.9.1 has some additional methods for trees that are used in ScriptGenE. A simple
‘python setup.py install’ as root will install the library under /usr/local.
Finally, if PI’s align.so needs to be rebuilt ‘python-pyrex’ needs to be installed.
Then run:
rm PI/align.so
make all && make clean
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3.6.2.3 Usage.
Figure 21 shows the usage of ScriptGenE.py. As can be seen in the figure there
are many options and two required arguments. A default target IP is required, since
it will be used to filter the Pcap file. If the Pcap file name ends with an IPv4 address,
however, then that IP will be used to filter the corresponding Pcap file instead. At
least one Pcap file must be specified, but any number of files can be used. Note, that
instead of specifying the options at every run, a configuration file can be used. For
instance, Figure 22 shows an example configuration file called ‘argtest.conf’. Each
option takes up one line. Using the example configuration file is then as simple as
calling ‘./ScriptGenE.py @argtest.conf’.
3.6.2.4 Processing a Pcap file.
Each Pcap is processed packet by packet. An initial filter on target IP and port (if
specified) is done. Additionally, any packets that are not IPv4/TCP are filtered out.
Messages are represented by packet number, sequence number (SN), acknowledgment
(ACK) number, data, and data length. These messages, or pmsg objects, are used in
a TCP connection. Each tcp_connection object consists of a 4-tuple, state, client
messages, and server messages. Connection objects that have matching 4-tuples are
considered equal. These object are used and maintained in a TCP connections table.
While processing the Pcap file, valid TCP connections are added to the table
as they are found. A TCP connection is considered valid if a 3-way handshake is
observed or if the server is observed sending data to a client. The latter is called
a ‘missed handshake session’. Retransmitted packets or those with no payload are
dropped. Figure 23 shows the state machine that is used to determine a connection’s
next state based on the TCP flags found in the packet and who the packet came from
(i.e., client or server). As can be seen in the figure, there are different states than
what was previously discussed during the networking review in Section 2.2.5.1.
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Figure 21. ScriptGenE.py Usage
73
Figure 22. Example ScriptGenE.py configuration file
Figure 23. tcp connection object life cycle
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States are described as follows:
None - (Default) connection that never was or was recently FIN’d
CLOSED - closed connection that was previously established
SYN - start of 3-way handshake (SYN correctly received)
SYN-ACK - second part of 3-way handshake (SYN-ACK correctly received)
ACK - 3rd part of 3-way handshake received (ESTABLISHED connection)
The reason the state machine looks different than what is typically found in lit-
erature is because this state machine does not represent a client or server state. It
represents the state of the session from a third party’s point of view. Additionally,
the FIN and RST states are special because they affect how the server will respond.
If a client sends a FIN or RST, the corresponding protocol tree will simply end with
the previous node (server message). This is considered a normal closed session. How-
ever, if the client sends something that makes the server respond with a RST or FIN,
then the emulator should follow suit. The replay options, which will be discussed
in Section 3.6.3 allow different repeat behavior depending on the type of final node
(CLOSED, FIN, or RST).
Also, note the transition from ‘FIN’ to ‘None’. This is there because at least one
more ACK is expected to properly close the connection. If it were closed immediately
then the next ACK (from the server) might be confused as belonging to a ‘missed
handshake session’. There is no need to wait around for more data after the first FIN-
ACK, so the connection is dropped and any other packets for it are ignored. Once
the TCP connection is concluded (highlighted states in Figure 23), a connection tree
is built.
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Building initial trees. The initial connection tree is built by first sorting
the client and server message lists by sequence numbers. This accounts for out of
order packets. Figures 24 and 25 show the initial output while parsing a Pcap file.
Each client and server message object are printed (minus data). Note, the message
number is equivalent to the unique frame identifier found in Wireshark.
Figure 24. Initial output while parsing Pcap file
Figure 25. Server messages from Pcap file
Next, the ACKs are used to correlate which messages are in response to the other.
From this the connection tree is iteratively built, resulting in one branch. If the server
sends a response upon connection, then this data is included in the ROOT node. Also,
the ‘missed handshake’ sessions are specially handled by creating a dummy client
message with data set to ’MISSING’. Later these sessions can be merged into the
P-tree where their respective message sequences align with other message sequences
in the P-tree.
It should also be noted that since this framework is designed to work at the
application layer, consecutive messages from one host are combined into one message.
This is a simpler approach than adding in dummy nodes and edges to represent no
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responses between consecutive messages. Figure 26 shows an example conversation
summary output that will make message consolidation more clear. In the figure it can
be seen that 30 RRPs have been found in the connection, and three of them are shown
(Note, the term RRP was originally used in [RCHJ14] as described in Section 2.3.3).
The first RRP consolidated three messages identified by their respective packet IDs.
The client actually sent three requests before the server began responding. Another
situation where messages are merged is if they are split due to their size (e.g., large
HTML pages). In this case, the algorithm merges them if the data length is greater
than the maximum segment size (MSS), which is assumed to be 1460 bytes for now.
This MSS value is derived by subtracting 40 bytes for the TCP/IP headers from 1500,
which corresponds to the common maximum transmission unit size for Ethernet.
Figure 26. Conversation summary
Environmental links. While building each connection tree, each consoli-
dated message is checked for environmental links. This is similar to what Roleplayer
does, but the implementation is currently not as thorough. IP addresses, ports, and
the server hostname are inferred by simply finding matching strings in the consoli-
dated messages. The IP addresses and ports are inferred from the trace itself, but
currently the hostname must be specified via a command line option. Future work
can pull hostnames from Domain Name System (DNS) messages within the trace.
It would also be worthwhile to search for other representations (hexadecimal, little
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endian, unicode, etc) and more types of environmental links (e.g., length fields). The
links themselves are stored in a dictionary called ‘env_links’ that is embedded into
the node or edge. The type of link (e.g., ‘server_ip’) is the key, and it points to
a tuple consisting of a list of offsets where matches were found and also the original
value itself.
3.6.2.5 Generalizing Trees.
Generalizing the P-trees is done by going through two rounds of consolidations.
First, however, a client lookup table aptly called ‘clientLUT’ is generated that
contains a unique index for every client Edge object. Each Edge object contains only
selected attributes from a P-tree client edge. Specifically, a parent node ID, child
node ID, and data are included. Every edge in the P-tree will potentially have its
data modified and merged, so the clientLUT provides a reference for the original
client message data. This is crucial for deriving and maintaining intra-protocol links.
Initial consolidation. After the clientLUT is created, the initial consoli-
dation begins. Its goal is to simply find and merge trivially matched edges before
starting the main consolidation. In a recursive depth first search (DFS) of the tree,
any edges that have the same parent and have equal data (other than environmental
links) are consolidated. To take differences due to environmental links into account,
markers are used to replace the linked data. Before comparing sequences, the linked
data is replaced with a marker equal to ‘#E-{type}#’, where ‘type‘ is the link type
(e.g., ‘#E-client_ip#’). While merging, the weight of the edge is increased by
the number of merges. Additionally, if the corresponding server responses do not
match, then the merge simply appends another response choice to the server node’s
data list. This helps account for variability in the server messages that is not due
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to the client messages (e.g., time-driven states). Finally, note that after this initial
consolidation all of the ‘missed handshake’ sessions will share the same consolidated
edge with ‘MISSING’ as its data. This makes it easier to use or remove this branch
later. Figure 27 shows an example of the output seen after initial consolidation.
Figure 27. Output from initial consolidation
Main consolidation. After the initial consolidation, the main consolidation
begins. Again, in a recursive DFS of the tree, any edges that have the same parent
are considered for consolidation. First, however, since handling ‘missed handshake’
sessions is not fully implemented, that branch is simply deleted for now. Remaining
neighboring edges are then Macroclustered using the Smith-Waterman local alignment
and UPGMA clustering from PI. However, instead of performing microclustering us-
ing region-wide mutation rates like ScriptGen, ScriptGenE checks if the corresponding
server messages cluster in the same groups. The intuition here is that even a one bit
change is significant if it causes the server’s response to be significantly different.
Thus, server message clustering is used to break up the client clusters as needed. As
a result, ScriptGenE is expected to require less samples than ScriptGen to correctly
microcluster. The downside to this approach, however, is that it can be computa-
tionally expensive for large clusters of large server messages (e.g., HTML responses).
ICS traffic, on the other hand, is typically expected to consist of many short messages
that will not require as much computations to process. It is recommended that future
work set a cluster and message size limit in order to always efficiently build P-trees re-
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gardless of the input sequences. Also, microclustering by region-wide mutation rates
would still be useful, because small changes that are not detectable by Macrocluster-
ing (client or server messages) can have significant meaning. With microclustering,
significant changes in even one bit can be detected given enough samples that show
that bit as significant.
Region Analysis. Once a Macrocluster has been created and aligned by
Needleman-Wunsch, Region Analysis is performed on the gapped consensus sequence.
This algorithm analyzes the aligned byte sequences and defines consecutive sequences
of bytes as a region based on:
1. Same DT (Zeros, Binary, Space, ASCII, or GAP)
2. MR within 0.1 (10%) and all bytes are either zero or non-zero
3. Gap presence the same (yes/no)
4. Same ‘kind’ of data for MCB (If ASCII: alpha, digit, or punctuation)
Notice ScriptGenE defines ‘kind’ as various forms of ASCII. It is unknown what the
ScriptGen authors actually intended to be a ‘kind’ of data.
Figure 28 shows an example of Region Analysis (RA) output for part of a HTML
GET request. This example uses ScriptGenE.py’s ‘--displayascii’ option to
display printable text for each MCB on the ‘TXT’ rows. The regions are identified by
the ‘RA’ row at the bottom of each block of aligned bytes. The ‘RA’ labels are boxed
in blue for easier identification. Fixed regions are identified with a ‘F’ and mutating
regions are identified with a ‘M’. Mutating bytes are identified by the entries in the
‘MR’ rows that are highlighted in red.
Notice the example in Figure 28 has gaps in the alignments, and some regions do
not have a MCB. In the case where the MCB is a gap, the GAP region is labeled with
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a ‘G’ instead of a ‘M’. Note, GAP regions are always mutating regions because the
alignment algorithms only produce gaps when aligned bytes differ. Therefore, while
gaps are artificially inserted into the sequences during alignment, they represent im-
portant information. This is why RA is performed on the gapped consensus sequence
instead of the ungapped consensus sequence. If the ungapped consensus sequence was
used to define regions for the sequences in Figure 28, then one byte would be missing
from the regions. Sequences 15 and 12 both have one gap in different places (circled
in blue over regions G00 and G03, respectively), but two gaps would be removed from
the ungapped consensus sequence. Thus, it is important to retain the gaps, but it
still must be recognized that they are not always to be used.
Figure 28. Example RA output - HTML
Next, Figure 29 shows an example of RA output for part of an EtherNet/IP
(ENIP) message. The naming convention is ‘{packetNumber}_{filename}’ for
parent and child IDs shown at the top. These client IDs correspond to the numbers
identifying each sequence row. The mutating regions highlighted in red are parts
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of the protocol’s ‘session handle’ and ‘sender context fields’. Note, region F07 is a
coincidental fixed region since it is actually a part of the variable sender context field
(discussed later in Section 5.3.2).
Finally, by comparing Figures 28 and 29 to PI’s original output in Figure 17, sev-
eral enhancements can be seen. RA, MCB, and TXT rows are added. The mutation
rate (MR) line is relabeled from ‘MT’ to ‘MR’ to better reflect its meaning. MRs
above a threshold (set at 0 currently) are highlighted, and the number of sequences is
provided. Additionally, the code providing output is rewritten with added efficiencies.
Create regular expression. After defining regions, ScriptGenE creates a
regular expression to represent the cluster based on the various fixed and mutat-
ing regions. Fixed region bytes are represented as is in the regex, while MRs are
represented by any byte over the size of the region. The regular expression could
represent MRs using only the byte types that are represented in the samples, but
it is assumed that MRs do not have a clearly defined DT with a limited number of
samples. An example regular expression is shown in Figure 30 that corresponds to
the cluster in Figure 29. Note, in Python regular expressions ‘\’ characters must be
escaped with a ‘\’, and ‘\x’ denotes a hexadecimal byte. The regular expression,
or regex, is compiled with the ‘re.DOTALL’ option so that ‘.’ corresponds to any
character. Therefore, parts of the regex such as ‘.{2,2}?’ (highlighted by red boxes
in Figure 30) mean that any character is allowed over the m to n range (where m and
n are both ‘2’ in this case). m is set at the number of aligned bytes in consecutive
mutating regions that never had a gap, and n is set at the number of aligned bytes
seen across the consecutive mutating regions plus an optional flex factor. The flex
factor takes effect when gaps are present and by default adds 10% to n rounded up
to the nearest byte. Thus, by default the flex factor will cause the regex to accept at
least one additional variable byte for regions with gaps. This additional flexibility is
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Figure 29. Example RA output - EtherNet/IP
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desired to account for cases where the client request may actually be slightly longer
than previously seen in the traces. This follows the intuition that regions with gaps
do not have a well defined length with a minimal set of traces.
Figure 30. Regular expression for example EtherNet/IP cluster
To better illustrate how gaps affect the regular expression, Figure 31 shows the
regular expression corresponding to the HTTP request in Figure 28 (Note, the regex
is for the entire message while only part of the message is shown in Figure 28). As can
be seen in Figure 31, the match interval representing the mutating regions has values
of 0 for m and 13 for n. m is 0 because sequence 1 has only gaps in the mutating
regions. n is 13 because there are 11 bytes in the mutating regions plus two bytes
(d(11 ∗ 0.1)e) added from the flex factor.
Figure 31. Regular expression for example HTTP cluster
Finally, the ‘?’ means to use characters non-greedily (i.e., do not use them unless
the match will fail otherwise). This is crucial for protocol fields that have variable
lengths, because the corresponding mutating region bytes may not need to be used
(particularly GAP regions as described previously). Overall, the described method
84
for creating regular expressions provides flexible, yet bounded matches for mutating
regions, while the expression parts describing fixed regions provide anchors to ensure
accuracy of the overall match.
Final cluster processing. After RA is complete on a cluster, it needs to be
further processed by finding intra-protocol dependencies (discussed in Section 3.6.2.6),
merging RRPs, and setting an attribute called ‘max_client_data_len’. The
attribute tells the replay engine the longest it should expect a client message to be.
This prevents unnecessary waiting.
Find default error message. After all of the tree clusters are processed, a
default error message is automatically selected. The default error message is used dur-
ing replay when the emulator does not have a matched response for an incoming client
request. Its purpose is to try to send something that looks believable enough that
the client will continue sending more requests. The algorithm searches for messages
without links to select within the pool of server messages by the following precedence:
1. Shortest message
2. Least frequency
3. First message of what is left
The intuition behind the selection criteria above is that common error messages are
probably shorter and less frequent than regular messages. For instance, common
HTTP error status codes such as ‘404 Not Found’ are communicated rather plain
and tersely, while normal HTTP responses typically include HTML pages that are full
of content. The reason nodes with links are not used is because protocol error mes-
sages are often sent due to invalid requests and links are based off of previous requests.
Lastly, if no suitable messages are found without links, then ‘ ’ (space) is returned
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as the default error message. It is important to note that ScriptGenEreplay.py has
multiple sources it can use for error messages (discussed in Section 3.6.3.9).
Output build summary. The final act of ScriptGenE.py is to output infor-
mation summarizing the qualities of the built P-trees. Figure 32 shows an example.
In this case, the example shows a perfect merge between five different sessions since
the final number of RRPs is 1
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, or 20%, the initial number (and there are no unclus-
tered edges or gaps). If there is an unclustered edge or gap, the previous edge to that
is listed in this section along with the total number of RRPs prior to the event. This
information is very useful since an unclustered edge indicates that the tree diverged
and split off a singular branch. Since that branch has no clusters it has no general
regex to represent it, and it does not have intra-protocol links identified! Identifying
links that are globally present (e.g., session IDs) would partially alleviate this issue.
For now, if the replayer goes down an unclustered path there is a good chance the
accuracy of replay will drop if the responses require linked information. Similarly, if
gaps are found in alignments, this indicates that there are errors in the alignment.
This can also lead to accuracy errors during replay.
Near the bottom of Figure 32 the actual bytes from the default error message are
displayed. Finally, statistics are given on how long building the tree took. Most of
the time is typically spent on clustering and aligning while generalizing the trees.
3.6.2.6 Intra-protocol dependencies.
Overview. Intra-protocol dependencies are linked bytes between a server
response and the preceding client message (e.g., a session ID). This means that linked
bytes from a client request will be duplicated in the server response at offsets defined
in the link. Server bytes can be linked to any matching client message substring of
at least two bytes. The process of finding intra-protocol dependencies first starts
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Figure 32. ScriptGenE final summary
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with finding a proposal for every RRP from an aligned cluster. Then, any duplicate
proposals are merged, and the weight of the proposal is increased by the number
of merges. Third, the list of unique proposals is printed. Fourth, proposals are
consolidated by picking the one with the highest per byte consensus or least number
of links. Finally, the cluster link summary is printed. The next sections cover the
above steps in detail.
Finding proposals. The first step for finding a proposal for a given RRP
is to find the significant fixed regions. Consecutive fixed regions are considered one
large fixed region for this purpose. Every region in the list of fixed regions is checked
to see if it is a unique sequence of bytes in the client message. If it is unique, then it
is added to the list of significant fixed regions.
Once the list of significant fixed regions is determined, they are considered markers
for potential links. Any “chunk” of bytes between two significant fixed regions is
checked for links. The marker preceding the chunk is the starting marker, and the
marker succeeding the chunk is the ending marker. The minimum size for a match is
two bytes. Therefore, if the chunk size is only one byte, the first byte of the ending
marker is also considered.
For every chunk of client data, a window of two bytes is defined at the start of the
client message and the corresponding server message. The window slides to the right
on the server message until a match is found between the windows. Both windows
are then expanded to the right while there is still a match and bytes are left to check
on each respective message. If the client chunk runs out of bytes first, an extra byte
from the ending marker can be used to check for a match. Once the window is at its
maximum width, a link is created. The link does not include the extra byte, so a link
of one byte is possible. After creating the link, the windows are reset to two bytes.
Then the server message window continues sliding to the right from where it last left
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off in order to check for more matches. Once the server window can no longer slide
to the right, it is moved back to the beginning of the server message and reset to two
bytes. The client window then slides one byte to the right and is reset at two bytes.
This process continues until the client window can no longer slide to the right inside
the chunk.
Processing a chunk as described previously results in a list of ‘LinkAttrib’ (link
attribute) objects, where each object consists of a tuple of a link, server offset, and
the original length of the linked data. This raw list must be deconflicted because
links cannot overlap on the server message. This is done by using a weighted interval
scheduling algorithm (previously described in Section 2.2.7.4). The weight, however,
is the original length of the link squared in order to give preference to longer substrings
versus the sum of many smaller substrings. The intuition here is that longer links are
less likely to be trivial.
It is important to note that a single sequence of bytes on the client message can
be linked to the server message at multiple offsets. This fact is used to consolidate
the links. Once a list of non-overlapping links is obtained, all of the matching links
have their server offsets combined into one list. Using the list of offsets, only one link
copy is needed.
The list of links is then checked for trivial links. Any link that has more occur-
rences (i.e., server offsets) than the ‘MAX_OFFSETS’ limit (set at two) is filtered out
of the list. A good example of why this is necessary is shown in Figures 33-35. Fig-
ure 33 shows an example of a trivial link that has eight server offsets. In this example,
both the client and server messages have numerous groups of zeros. Figure 34 shows
the resultant proposals where a total of 10 links (denoted by ‘# L #’) can be found.
Finally, Figure 35 shows the resultant proposals after filtering out eight trivial links.
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Figure 33. Unfiltered trivial link
Figure 34. Unfiltered link proposals
Figure 35. Filtered link proposals
90
After filtering the list of links, a proposal is created by replacing linked bytes
with ‘#L#’ markers. This is similar to what was described in Section 3.6.2.5 for
environmental links. The markers are used to make comparing different proposals
easier. The linked data may be different between proposals, but the dependencies
represented by the links could be the same.
After a proposal is generated for every RRP in the cluster, duplicates are merged
and the weight of the respective proposal is increased by the number of merges. Then,
the list of unique proposals is printed as was shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.
Consolidating proposals. After the list of unique proposals is generated,
one proposal must be selected to represent the group. This filters out coincidental
links. Picking this consolidated answer is done using an algorithm similar to what was
described for ScriptGen in Section 3.5. However, the general algorithm for ScriptGen’s
link consolidation described in [LDM06] leaves a lot of ambiguities and questions.
ScriptGen’s algorithm immediately discards a proposal once it does not possesses the
MCB for an aligned byte. However, what happens if there are an even number of
proposals, half of them have a certain value in the first byte, and the other half share
a different value? How are ties broken, and how are the correct half of proposals
chosen? Secondly, referring to Figure 19, the longest proposal (number 5) seems to
be arbitrarily chosen. Proposal number 6 could just have as easily been picked on
the seventh byte. What is truly the best criteria for breaking ties, and what is the
specific algorithm for guaranteeing that the consolidated answer matches at least one
proposal?
Thus, this research presents a novel algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 4, that
answers all of these questions. One of the main ideas behind it is that proposals with
less links are less likely to have coincidental links. This means that longer proposals
are not always better. Additionally, Algorithm 4 does not dismiss a proposal early on
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simply because it does not have the MCBs for every aligned byte up to the last byte
position checked. Rather, it calculates how many MCBs each proposal has over the
total number of aligned bytes checked. Each aligned byte may have multiple MCBs
(i.e., ties), so each one could potentially add to a proposal’s score. Also, calculating
the MCBs for each aligned byte is only done while most of the proposals have a byte
(i.e., not a GAP) at that position. Once the list of MCBs for an aligned byte contains
a GAP, that list is discarded and byte frequencies are not counted further for that
round. The intuition here is that if most of the proposals are only n bytes long, then
checking further will only skew the results (and inherently give preference to longer
proposals).
Next, all of the proposals that have the highest score (i.e., most MCBs) are put
in the ‘bestProposals’ list. The algorithm then repeats recursively on smaller, more
focused proposal lists until the list size no longer shrinks, or it gets down to two
proposals or less. The smaller lists are ‘more focused’ because previous rounds filtered
out less important proposals. The MCBs at each aligned byte may change due to the
filtering. Thus, each round converges further to the overall solution.
Once the algorithm has converged as much as possible using MCB scores, other
measures are used to break ties. If more than one proposal is left then the list is
paired down further by selecting those with the least number of links. If there are
still multiple proposals left, then the first one is arbitrarily selected.
Additionally, as can be seen in Algorithm 4, the MCBs for each aligned byte are
only calculated if more than two unique proposals are given as input. As discussed in
the last section, all of the proposals are unique, and they have a weight assigned to
them describing how many copies of the proposal there were prior to consolidation.
Thus, given a good cluster with highly similar proposals, this algorithm can very
efficiently select a proposal.
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Algorithm 4 Consolidate Link Proposals
Input: initial proposals list where each proposal is a tuple of (ID, message, weight)
and all messages are unique
function consolidateLinkProposals(proposals, done = FALSE)
if done or <= 2 proposals left then
if > 1 proposals left then
if 2 proposals left AND weights are not equal then
return the proposal with the highest weight
end if . Otherwise, pick proposal by least links
selectedProposals = proposals with least number of links
if only 1 selectedProposal then
return selectedProposal
end if
end if
return first proposal of what is left in list . default return
else . not done finding best proposals
taking weight into account, find the MCBs for each aligned byte in proposals
up to the most frequent message length
. (i.e., stop when one of the most frequent bytes is a ‘GAP’)
delete last MCB list entry that contains ‘GAP’
bestProposals = list of proposals with the highest number of MCBs
if no change in proposals list length then
done = TRUE
end if
return consolidateLinkProposals(bestProposals, done)
end if
end function
93
Finally, to solidify understanding Algorithm 4, it will be applied to the example
proposal list from Figure 19. All of the seven proposals are assumed to have a weight
of one. During the first round the MCBs are B, L, B, and L, respectively, for the
first four aligned bytes. For the fifth aligned byte, both B and GAP have the highest
frequency. That MCB list is discarded, and the round ends with proposals 1 and 2
being discarded. During round two the MCBs are the same until the fifth aligned
byte. B is the MCB for the fifth byte. B and GAP are the MCBs for byte six.
Proposals 3 and 7 are discarded. During round three proposal 4 is discarded. This
leaves only two proposals. Proposal 5 is then selected because it has only two links,
while proposal 6 has three links.
Cluster Link Summary. After proposals for every RRP have been found
and consolidated down to one, the final list of links for the cluster is printed in
the cluster link summary. As can be seen in the example in Figure 36, the cluster
link summary shows the actual links from the chosen proposal along with information
about the proposal list. The number of valid link proposals is the number of proposals
that matched the consolidated proposal. Thus, it gives a measure of confidence in
the answer. In the example from Figure 36, all of the proposals were the same, so it
is very likely the chosen proposal is correct. Finally, the ‘Representative Child ID’
is the corresponding server node ID for the chosen proposal. This node ID is the
container for merging the cluster RRPs.
Link limitations. There are a few limitations regarding finding intra-proto-
col dependencies:
1. Links will only be found for clustered messages
2. Links are only found for the previous client message, but the link may actually
be to a client message much earlier in the session
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Figure 36. Cluster link summary
3. Only one consolidated server message is generated in output (required to filter
out incidental matches)
• this means that unique server messages due to external factors (e.g., time)
will be dropped
4. Arbitrary links can still be found since two or more bytes may coincidentally
match from the client message to the server message
• this is particularly true when considering text protocols such as HTML
3.6.2.7 Protocol Tree Exports.
Three different kinds of files are exported from ScriptGenE. First, there are Python
pickle files that are exported for both the initial and final trees. Python pickle files
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are binary representations of a Python object. Because of this, the classes that the
object requires must be able to be loaded into memory when importing the pickle
file. Thus, to import a P-tree, the ScriptGenE module files must be in place.
The second kind of exported files are pictures of the protocol trees. These PNG
format pictures are optionally created, and they allow the structure of the P-tree to
be quickly assessed. Figure 37 shows a simple example of an initial protocol tree
built from two similar traces. Figure 38 shows the corresponding final tree after it
has been generalized. It should be noted that there is a limit to how wide of a tree
can be represented using this format. It is observed that an excess of 200 branches
will cause the picture to not be created. This is a limitation of the pygraphviz library
that networkx uses to create the picture. However, long sessions appear to be able
to be represented. Viewing individual nodes then requires zooming in on the areas of
interest. Improved visual representations of large protocol trees is left as future work.
Figure 37. A simple initial protocol tree
The final exported file type is a Graph Exchange XML Format (GEXF) of the
initial tree. Figure 39 shows part of the GEXF file opened in Firefox web browser.
Different parts of the XML structure can be collapsed and opened by clicking on the
‘-’ or ‘+’ sign to the left of the tags. Unlike the picture format, this representation
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Figure 38. A simple final protocol tree
can include attributes, and the XML format is well suited for importing information
into a variety of programs. However, binary data cannot be represented without first
encoding it. Also, the networkx export function for the GEXF format only allows
certain types of Python structures to be included. As a result, many attributes have
to be converted prior to exporting them. Currently, only the node ID, type, and
weight are exported. Future work can include other attributes if they are found to
be needed.
3.6.3 ScriptGenEreplay.py.
3.6.3.1 Overview.
ScriptGenEreplay.py takes a set of input arguments that define the server to be
emulated. The specified P-tree is quickly loaded, and a server socket is opened
on the chosen port. The IP address is determined by the chosen interface. Upon
a client connection, the server sends a “welcome” message if it has one stored in
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Figure 39. Viewing a GEXF file in Firefox
ROOT’s data. The TCP connection provides the data from the client in a stream
of bytes, so every chunk of data received is checked for a match. This process con-
tinues until either the expected number of bytes have been received (as determined
by max_client_data_len described in Section 3.6.2.5), a match is found, or an
error occurs.
If a match is found, the corresponding server message is retrieved and sent if it
has valid data. The matched client data is then removed from further consideration.
If no match is found, or if the server response has no valid data (e.g., it is an empty
FIN/RST node or has missing linked data), then an unknown transition is handled.
Depending on how the emulator options are configured, the server will either close
the connection, backtrack to a different state with a matching transition, or remain
in the same state while sending a default error message.
During the whole session a counter keeps track of the matched client messages.
This is not only used to determine how many messages the server was able to handle,
but it also is used to determine if backtracking is allowed. The following sections
describe the usage and major parts of ScriptGenEreplay.py in detail.
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3.6.3.2 Usage.
The usage and options for ScriptGenEreplay.py are shown in Figure 40. As can
be seen in the figure, the only required arguments are the P-tree file name to import
and the port the server should run on. The initial IP address for the server will be
automatically detected by the chosen network interface (default interface is lo). The
server host name should be specified if the P-tree was created with environmental
links for the server host. This is particularly important if the host name in the
original traces is a different length than the chosen host name for the emulator. The
‘--original_data’ option is intended for cases where it is more desirable to use
the original environmental data rather than the environmental data of the emulator’s
session (see Section 3.6.3.5).
The ‘--repeat’ and ‘--strict’ options define how unknown transitions are
handled (see Section 3.6.3.7). Repeating is defined by the ‘--repeat’ option and
only takes effect when the end of the tree is reached. If set to ’open’, then backtracking
will only occur if the final node is a regular ’MSG’ node. Setting the option to ’always’
ignores the final node type. Finally, setting the option to ‘never’ prevents repeating
all together.
Whether or not backtracking is allowed, however, is dependent on the number of
matched client messages and the ‘--strict’ option. The strict option determines
how many client messages must be matched before backtracking is allowed. For
instance, the strict option can be used to make sure a valid application session is
setup prior to allowing the client to diverge from the order of states in the P-tree. If
the user knows a valid session starts after five transitions, then the strict option is set
to five. By default, there is no restriction set, and setting the option to −1 disables
backtracking.
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Next, the ‘--default_error’ option allows the default error message that is
stored in the tree to be overridden (see Section 3.6.3.9). Finally, the ‘--debug’ and
‘--verbose’ options change the message level to DEBUG or INFO, respectively.
Setting either of these will allow the hexdump of the matched client messages to be
viewed in INFO messages.
3.6.3.3 Initialization.
After checking that the program input arguments are valid, the P-tree is imported
and a server socket is opened. This socket uses two modified TCP options. First,
nagling is turned off so that small TCP packets are not combined and buffered before
being sent. While the emulator is designed at the application layer, it is desirable for
messages to be sent as represented in the protocol tree. Secondly, keep alive packets
are also sent every eight seconds of idle time. This is to help keep the connection
open with the client and encourage an adversary to continue using the honeypot.
As mentioned previously, the server IP address is automatically detected by the
chosen network interface. However, after the socket is created using that IP ad-
dress, getsockname() is called to obtain the IP address and port of the socket.
This is done so that ScriptGenEreplay can also be used as a Honeyd subsystem
(i.e., stand alone service script). As discussed in [PH07], Honeyd hooks into the
getsockname() function call in order to allow programs to determine the virtual
IP and port that Honeyd assigned to them. If Honeyd is not being used, then the
same IP address and port will be returned.
Next, the obtained server IP and port, along with the host name (if provided), is
added to a dictionary storing the session environmental information. Once a client
connects, their IP address and port are also added to the dictionary. Additionally,
if the P-tree ROOT node has data in it (i.e., the server has a “welcome” message),
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Figure 40. ScriptGenEreplay.py Usage
101
then the data is sent to the client. Currently, only one client connection is supported
at a time.
3.6.3.4 Matching client requests.
As discussed previously, every chunk of client data received is checked for a match.
All of the current node’s outgoing edges are compared against the received client data.
If there are no outgoing edges (i.e., the current node is a tree leaf), then an unknown
transition must be handled. Before comparing the client data to tree edge data, bytes
in the client data must be replaced by environmental link markers as specified in the
edge env_links attribute. The edge data itself can either be a byte string (for
unclustered edge) or a regular expression (for a clustered edge). If more than one
edge matches the marked up client data, then an edge is chosen in order of preference
by:
1. largest weight
2. largest number of descendants
3. random selection
Choosing an edge by the largest number of descendants is unique to the ScriptGenE
Framework. An edge with the most descendants is desirable because this maximizes
the number of future transitions that can be handled before backtracking. Finally, the
selected edge ID is printed, and a hexdump of the matched client data is optionally
logged in an INFO message.
3.6.3.5 Marking up client data.
Replacing bytes in client data with markers is done in increasing order of offsets.
There may be a difference in the length of the marker and the length of the replaced
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bytes. Thus, one change can affect offsets of later bytes. While replacing bytes with
the markers, these potential length differences are factored into a cumulative offset
difference.
In addition to using correct offsets, replacing bytes with markers also requires
that the correct number of bytes be replaced. The number of bytes to replace for a
given marker is equal to the length of the respective environmental link’s value for
the current session. However, if the emulator options specify to use original data for
client messages, then the length of the original linked data is used.
These length differences are one of the reasons why the emulator allows original
data to be used for environmental links. Since the current implementation does not
detect length fields, it may be desirable to use original data instead of data detected
from the environment. If the contextual data has a different length than the original
environmental data, then length fields in the resultant message may not be correct.
Since client applications often use length fields to parse messages, an incorrect length
field will typically cause the client to either truncate the server message or wait for the
rest of it to arrive. The other reason to use the original data is for testing the protocol
tree. clientReplay.py also has the option to use original data, so ScriptGenEreplay.py
can be used with it to replay the original session.
3.6.3.6 Checking for FIN or RST nodes.
As discussed in the Overview in Section 3.6.3.1, it is important to know if the next
server message is a FIN or RST. If the next node’s type is normal (i.e., ‘MSG’), then
replay continues normally. However, if the next node’s type is ‘FIN’ or ‘RST’, then
it must be specially handled. If backtracking is allowed and the ‘--repeat’ option
is set to ‘always’, then the node is treated like a normal leaf node. Thus, if the node
has data, then the data will be sent. If, on the other hand, it does not have data,
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an equivalent edge must be found in the tree that leads to a node with data (i.e., an
unknown transition must be handled).
For the cases where repeating or backtracking is not allowed, the connection will
be closed. If the node has data, then it is included while sending a FIN flag to close
the connection. If there is no data to send, then the method of closing the connection
depends on the node type. In the case of a RST node the connection is abruptly
closed; no further data is read or written by the server’s network buffers.
3.6.3.7 Handling unknown transitions.
Handling unknown transitions is required any time a client message cannot be
matched against any of the outgoing edges of the current state. This can happen
when the end of the tree is reached (i.e., current state is a leaf and has no outgoing
edges), or when the client message simply does not match the available transitions
from the current state. In the case that the current node is a leaf, backtracking will
occur if backtracking and repeating are allowed. For non-leaf nodes, backtracking
will occur as long as it is allowed. If backtracking is unsuccessful, then the current
state remains the same and a default error message is sent. If, on the other hand,
backtracking is not allowed then the connection is closed after sending the default
error message.
3.6.3.8 Backtracking.
Backtracking is one of the novel algorithms presented in this research that make
ScriptGenE more flexible in its emulation of ICS devices. It is used whenever an
unknown transition must be handled. The goal of the algorithm is to simply find
the earliest P-tree edge that matches the current client request and return the corre-
sponding next state (i.e., server response).
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The algorithm is as follows. First, the path from ROOT to the current node is
determined by iteratively getting each node’s parents. Then, starting from ROOT
and moving down the found path, each node’s outgoing edges are checked until a valid
match is found. If no match is found along the path, then a BFS of the edges in the
tree is performed until a match is found. The BFS is modified to skip any previously
checked edges. If no matches are found then ‘None’ is returned as the next node.
The described algorithm makes emulating ICS devices more flexible because these
devices often enter long polling sessions where data values are reported. There are
typically repeating patterns in the traffic generated by these sessions because control
systems attempt to maintain equilibrium in the controlled process. Because of back-
tracking, the P-tree only needs to represent part of the polling session. Once, the
end of the tree is reached, the next response is found by backtracking to the earliest
matching request. Thus, backtracking enables looping of session content. Emulat-
ing the repeating behavior of polling sessions is why the path to the current node is
checked first. However, when the session diverges from previous content, the BFS of
the other edges allows the P-tree to handle the client request regardless of the current
state. As previously described in Section 3.6.3.2, the ‘--strict’ option controls
backtracking by setting the minimum number of matched client requests required for
backtracking to be enabled. Overall, backtracking is designed to be a powerful and
flexible emulation technique.
3.6.3.9 Sending default error message.
In the event, however, that backtracking cannot find an appropriate server state
to use for responding, a default error message is sent. If a default error message was
found during the tree building process, then the tree’s ROOT node will have a tuple
stored in an attribute called ‘default_error’. The tuple consists of a node ID and
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a data string. The data string is the chosen error message, and the node ID identifies
which node the message came from. The ID can then be used to lookup any node
information (e.g., links and env_links) that is required to manipulate the error
message. The current implementation only inserts environmental data into the error
message. Since environmental information remains the same throughout a session,
once the information has been inserted into the error message the new value replaces
the original string in the ‘default_error’ attribute.
However, using the error message from the ROOT attribute is not the only source
that ScriptGenEreplay.py can use. As previously described in Section 3.6.3.2, the
‘--default_error’ option allows the default error message that is stored in the
tree to be overridden. The option’s value can be a file name, raw byte stream (with
hex values escaped), ‘#REPEAT#’, or blank. Using a file name allows loading up
to a 10KB message from a file. Not providing a value with the option or specifying
‘#REPEAT#’ causes the server to repeat the last message sent whenever a default error
message is requested. Currently, this message is re-sent as is without considering links.
3.6.3.10 Getting the server response.
Prior to sending out a server response, the raw marked up data must have data
inserted into it. Specifically, linked data must first be inserted, and then environ-
mental data must be inserted. While inserting linked data, a default error message
is sent if the linked data cannot be found. This unusual scenario could occur if the
client data is missing a marker, which infers that the regular expression is not specific
enough. Once all of the linked data for a server message is successfully determined,
it is inserted into the message in offset order similar to the environmental link inser-
tion procedure described in Section 3.6.3.5. A cumulative difference is the offset is
maintained here as well.
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Finally, in the event that more than one server response is available to choose
from, the one with the highest weight is selected. If the weights are equal, then a
random selection is made.
3.7 Design Summary
In summary, this chapter describes the ScriptGenE Framework design. The frame-
work is designed to be accurate, flexible, and efficient for emulating ICS devices. Its
design is based off of techniques from ScriptGen, Roleplayer, and some novel contri-
butions of this research.
The features unique to ScriptGenE include:
1. handles unknown transitions with novel backtracking algorithm
2. mimics long polling sessions through looping
3. sends default error message to maintain conversation when expected response
is unknown
4. determines environmental and protocol dependency links while using unique
filtering algorithms to remove trivial links
5. includes initial handling of partial (missed handshake) connections
6. provides stand alone server and client replay applications with flexible options
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IV. Research Methodology
4.1 Goals
This research focuses on developing a framework for automatically configuring
PLC emulators and providing a working proof of concept implementation. The goals
in testing the implementation align with the design parameters discussed in Sec-
tion 3.2. Namely, the following questions related to accuracy, flexibility, and efficiency
must be addressed:
Accuracy
1. What percent of the time can the emulator produce traffic that is accepted
as normal behavior by standard tools?
2. How similar are the bytes between a conversation using an emulator versus
a conversation generated with a real PLC?
Flexibility
1. Can the same emulator configuration tools be used for different protocols
without requiring any protocol-specific knowledge?
2. Can the emulator recover from errors or unknown transitions?
Efficiency
1. Can the protocol tree building and replay process be successful while being
completely automated?
2. How many input traces are required for configuration in order to achieve
a 100% acceptance rate by the tool interrogating the emulator?
3. How fast can the protocol trees be built?
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4.2 Approach
A framework called ScriptGenE is developed that builds protocol trees by parsing
conversations from network traces. The protocol trees are then loaded into a server
that uses them to send responses from tree nodes based on the client requests that
correspond to tree edges. The details of this process are covered in Chapter III.
Testing the framework involves generating network traffic of various ICS-related
protocols and capturing traces of the traffic. Standard tools are selected for each
protocol, and they are used to interrogate a PLC to create reference packet cap-
tures. Subsets of increasing order of these traces are then used to build emulator
profiles. Next, instead of the PLC, each emulator profile is interrogated by the se-
lected standard tools to create experimental captures. Measurements are taken on
the interrogator’s response to determine if the tool found the emulation acceptable.
Measurements on the byte variability differences between the reference captures and
the experimental captures are used to determine if they are statistically equivalent.
Finally, logs are parsed or viewed to determine how fast trees are built, how well the
trees are built, and if the emulator successfully recovered from unknown transitions.
Each protocol is tested in a different experiment since different build parameters,
replay parameters, and workload are used. A web protocol and two PLC control
protocols are selected for experimentation. Most PLCs use a web protocol and control
protocol, and they are very different in structure and use.
4.3 System Boundaries
As shown in Figure 41, the system under test (SUT) is the ScriptGenE Frame-
work. The components of the system are the protocol tree building software (Script-
GenE.py) and the protocol tree replay software (ScriptGenEreplay.py). Both of these
components under test (CUT) provide metrics for evaluating the system.
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The workload into the system is a set of unique reference traces of varying number.
For each experiment, reference traces are generated using a different task against a
PLC configuration. The input traces are then processed by ScriptGenE.py using a
set of build options for each experiment. The resulting protocol tree is then imported
into ScriptGenEreplay.py in order to generate experimental traces using a set of replay
options.
The metrics to evaluate the system include three parts. First, ScriptGenE.py’s
log file is parsed for every emulator profile to collect the number of nodes that were
processed per second. Second, the interrogator’s response to the emulator is evaluated
as a PASS or FAIL. Finally, the server response accuracy is determined by statistical
analysis of the difference in variability between the reference traces and experimental
traces.
4.4 Services and Outcomes
The service that the SUT provides is the automatic configuration of a PLC em-
ulator. The specific emulator services are determined by the PLC tasks that are
encompassed within the set of input traces.
There are three outcomes for each emulator service. These include: an accurately
configured emulator, an inaccurately configured emulator, or a non-functioning em-
ulator. An accurately configured emulator will always produce responses that the
scripted interrogator task expects, and the resultant experimental trace will be sta-
tistically equivalent to the set of reference traces.
An inaccurately configured emulator, however, will not always generate the correct
responses required. Thus, it may not always produce responses that the scripted
interrogator task expects, and the resultant experimental trace will be statistically
different than the set of reference traces. The latter is measured by byte differences
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per each message. It is assumed the interrogator sends equivalent request messages
for a task when given a set of correct responses. Thus, any statistically significant
byte differences are due to incorrect responses from the emulator.
Finally, the emulator is considered non-functioning if the P-tree build process
does not result in a usable P-tree pickle file for ScriptGenEreplay.py to import. This
can happen, for instance, if improper build options are used that filter out all of the
necessary packets from the input traces. Improper replay options can also prevent
the emulator from functioning properly.
4.5 Parameters and Factors
There are workload parameters and system parameters; parameters that vary are
called factors. The values that these factors hold are called the levels. The remainder
of this section describes the parameters and how they apply to the SUT.
4.5.1 Workload parameters.
4.5.1.1 Task.
One application task is selected for each of the chosen protocols to experiment
on. In particular, wget is used to mirror a PLC’s web server pages over HTTP,
and RSLinx and STEP7 are used to browse for a PLC on the network and view
its modules over EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP, respectively. The options used when
running wget are:
-q -r --page-requisites --no-parent -w 0.2 --tries 1 $server
which does a quiet recursive download of all pages beneath the root directory of
the selected $server. All page requisites, including images and style sheets, are
also downloaded. Additionally, there is a wait time of 0.2 seconds between requests.
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Pilot testing shows that the time delay is required to avoid overloading the PLC
with requests. Finally, the wget options above also specify that each download is
only tried once. If there are errors preventing a download, wget will quit. This
option makes it more obvious if the emulator is not accurately replaying the expected
responses.
Unlike wget, however, RSLinx and STEP7 are applications driven by a GUI.
SikuliX [Hoc15] is employed for this research in order to automate tasks using RSLinx
and STEP7. More details on how SikuliX is included later in Section 4.9.
All of the above tasks are chosen because they are representative of actions an
adversary might initially take when gathering information about a PLC. An attacker
may, for instance, view or download a PLC’s web page in order to view system con-
figuration information, uptime, etc. However, more information can be gleaned from
interfacing the PLC with RSLogix or STEP7. If the attacker wants to learn about the
ladder logic on the PLC, for instance, they can perform a program ‘upload’ to obtain
a copy. Before this or other remote actions can be performed via RSLogix, however,
RSLinx must be used to establish communication with the PLC (see Section 2.2.2).
This task is accomplished by using RSWho to find the PLC on the network and pop-
ulate a list of available modules. Similarly, in STEP7 station objects (e.g., controller
module information) must be uploaded to the programmer by configuring a network
node.
Additionally, HTTP, EtherNet/IP, and ISO-TSAP are the chosen protocols for
the experiments in this research because they represent different classes of protocols
(see Section 2.2.5.2). Thus, experimenting with the protocols provides an indication
of the SUT’s protocol-agnostic robustness.
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4.5.1.2 Set of traces.
By performing the application tasks described in the last section, network traffic
is generated. This traffic is randomly captured for each task run in order to generate
a set of reference captures. Next, random combinations of n traces from the pool
of reference captures serve as input to the SUT. Thus, both experiments use the
number of traces per emulation profile as a factor. Each level is tested on a separate
experimental run. The HTTP experiment uses two levels, and the EtherNet/IP and
ISO-TSAP experiments use four levels.
For the HTTP experiment, 60 reference captures are generated for each exper-
imental run. n is set at one for the first run, and two for the second run. Both
experimental runs build 60 emulator profiles using the combinations of reference cap-
tures.
For the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP experiments, 12 reference captures are gen-
erated for each experimental run. The value of n ranges from three to six captures per
emulator profile. Additionally, 32 emulator profiles are generated per experimental
run.
For each experiment, the number of traces per emulation profile are chosen based
on design features and pilot testing results. For instance, pilot testing shows that
intra-protocol dependencies are unimportant for emulating the PLC’s HTTP re-
sponses. Thus, the importance of clustering for this particular task is found to be
negligible. As a result, it is hypothesized that as little as one trace is required to
accurately replay the HTTP responses. An additional run with two traces is also
tested in order to test the effect of providing multiple server responses for a given
request.
For the EtherNet/IP experiment, pilot testing shows that a minimum of two traces
is enough to accurately emulate responses if the system’s initial state is consistent.
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This experiment, however, is randomized, so it is hypothesized that a minimum of
three traces are required to accurately emulate the EtherNet/IP responses. More
traces makes it less likely that the SUT will consider variable protocol fields as fixed
regions. Thus, the cluster regular expressions will be more accurate. Using three
traces also follows the intuition that an odd number of input traces is preferable,
because an odd number of proposals more likely break any ties during the link con-
solidation phase (Section 3.6.2.6). Six was chosen as the highest number of traces per
profile to test because it is double the value of the minimum level while still being
within the design parameter of a maximum of seven traces (Section 3.2).
Finally, pilot testing shows that the traffic generated by the ISO-TSAP task has
less variability than the EtherNet/IP experiment. It is hypothesized that only two
traces are required to accurately emulate responses, so a range of two to five input
traces is tested.
4.5.1.3 Build options.
The build options inputted into ScriptGenE.py for the HTTP experiment are
-p 80 -x -a -M 0
This tells ScriptGenE.py to filter traces on port 80, exclude creating tree pictures,
show printable text in any RA output, and disable Macroclustering.
Macroclustering is disabled for the HTTP experiment for two reasons. One, as
described in the previous subsection, clustering is not required to accurately emulate
the responses. Two, the current implementation does not include the microclustering
capability required to separate some of the GET requests into different groups. In
particular, pilot testing shows that many of the GET requests identify desired re-
sources by a single or two digit ID. Macroclustering is not fine grained enough to
separate these GET requests appropriately, and clustering is made more difficult be-
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cause nearly all of the requests are from a different session (i.e., positional clustering
does not help). Macroclustering the server responses, on the other hand, does sepa-
rate some of the requests as needed, but clustering all of the relatively large server
responses is very slow. In fact, the average number of nodes processed per second
is nearly 100 times greater if Macroclustering is disabled instead. For all of these
reasons, Macroclustering is disabled for this experiment.
Next, the build options for the EtherNet/IP experiment are
-p 44818 -x -M 0.5
This tells ScriptGenE.py to filter traces on port 44818, exclude creating tree pictures,
and use 0.5 for the Macroclustering threshold.
Macroclustering in this experiment is set at ScripteGenE.py’s default value. It
should be noted, however, that the default value for ScriptGenE.py is selected based
on pilot testing various protocols and also findings in previous research [LMD05,
BGH14]. In fact, this is the reason why the experiment does not use the Macroclus-
tering threshold as a factor; a sane default is determined for clustering protocols in
general.
Finally, the build options for the ISO-TSAP experiment are
-p 102 -x -M 0.5
The only difference from the EtherNet/IP experiment options is the port that is being
targeted.
4.5.1.4 Replay options.
The replay options inputted into the ScriptGenEreplay.py script for the HTTP
experiment are
-i $IFACE -f --strict -v
116
This tells ScriptGenEreplay.py to use the value of variable ‘$IFACE’ for selecting
the interface. Additionally, the server will run forever (‘-f’) or until instructed to
shutdown by a keyboard interrupt. Third, the ‘--strict’ option is used to disallow
any backtracking. Finally, the verbose switch enables capturing hex dumps of the
client message in INFO messages.
For the HTTP experiment, it is important that the server stay up, because each
wget session has multiple connections. Unfortunately, this means the server must be
forcefully brought down after the task is complete. Next, backtracking is disallowed to
ensure that the emulator will send the default error message and close the connection
for any unknown request. Pilot testing shows that the majority of all RRPs for this
task are separate TCP connections, so there is no benefit to searching other branches
of the tree (all of them spread out from ROOT).
The replay options for the EtherNet/IP experiment are
-i $IFACE -v -d
The difference from the previously shown options for HTTP is that backtracking is
allowed (by default), the server will shutdown after a connection ends (by default),
and the default error message is set to repeat the previous server message.
Ideally, the server will shut itself down after every task is complete. Since pilot
testing shows that the network traces for the EtherNet/IP task include only one
TCP connection, it is safe to have the server shutdown after a connection closes.
This prevents having to forcefully bring down the server via an interrupt, which takes
more time.
Next, the default error message is set to repeat previous server messages in order
to test this unique feature. Additionally, pilot testing shows that the default error
message selected based on the algorithm in Section 3.6.2.5 is unsatisfactory for Ether-
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Net/IP traces. It is hypothesized that limiting the message selection to only unlinked
responses is a contributing factor.
Finally, the replay options for the EtherNet/IP experiment are
-i $IFACE -f -v -d
The only difference from the EtherNet/IP replay option is that the server will not
shutdown after a client disconnects. Just like in the HTTP experiment, multiple
connections must be handled for every task conversation.
4.5.2 System parameters.
As shown previously in Figure 41, the system parameters consist of the computing
parameters and PLC configuration. The former will be discussed in the experimental
setup (Section 4.9). The PLC configurations, however, are as follows:
Allen-Bradley ControlLogix5561 (L61) PLC
• Firmware version 19.015
• Slot 0 - EtherNet/IP ENBT
• Slot 1 - L61 Controller with mode set to REM Run (remote Run)
• Slot 6 - DC Output
Siemens SIMATIC S7-300 PLC
• Firmware version 3.2
• Slot 2 - CPU 315-2 Controller with two Ethernet ports
• Slot 3 - Discrete I/O (DI8/DO8)
• Slot 4 - Analog I/O (AI4/AO2)
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Note, REM (remote) PLC modes allow RSLogix to change the mode of the PLC
when it is online with the software. However, the current experiment with RSLinks
does not require this functionality. Remote Run is thus equivalent to the normal Run
mode for the purposes of this experiment. Finally, the Run mode is more desirable
than the Program mode because the former allows ladder logic to execute. This
allows the PLC to affect changes in the DC Output module, which may be reflected in
interactions with the PLC via the network. Thus, having the PLC running potentially
provides more variability in the network traces. The program executed on the L61
performs a lighting demo by providing power for lights (in a pattern) from the DC
output module.
4.6 Performance Metrics
This research uses three performance metrics. The first one measures how quickly
protocol trees are built for a given task. Specifically, the total wall clock time and
the number of nodes processed per second is extracted from each build log.
The second performance metric measures how well an emulator profile produces
traffic that is accepted as normal behavior by standard tools (i.e., wget and RSLinx).
In both cases, each emulator’s performance is graded as a PASS or FAIL based upon
output of the interrogating tool. If the task completes without errors, then it is
considered a PASS. Otherwise, it is graded as a FAIL.
In the case of the HTTP experiment, the graded output is the downloaded web
content. Web content downloaded from the PLC serves as a baseline that the down-
loaded content from the emulator can be compared to. If the content is evaluated to
be complete based on the comparison to the baseline group, then the task is considered
a PASS.
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For the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP experiments, the graded output is the RSLinx
and STEP7 GUIs, respectively. For instance, if the RSWho window shows the em-
ulator as a “valid” PLC with all of the correct modules populated, then the task is
considered a PASS. If any error messages or icons are shown, or if the task does not
complete, then it is considered a FAIL.
The third performance metric measures the accuracy of the traffic produced by the
emulator by assessing byte differences between reference and experimental captures.
In contrast to previous research [Jar82, Fin90], however, the metric used in this
research does not attempt to whitelist any bytes as acceptable because they are known
to belong to stateful protocol fields (i.e., fields that are expected to vary). There are
two reasons for this. One, the whitelist method requires that all of the variable regions
are known and accounted for. This may not always be the case, and this research
is intended to be protocol-agnostic. Therefore, it makes sense for the evaluation
techniques to be protocol-agnostic as well. Secondly, just because certain bytes in
a protocol field can vary does not mean that they will vary during typical sessions.
Indeed, even if they do vary, the rate of their variance and the values they take on
is likely to be specific to their use in the session. As an example, consider a typical
number counter. All of the digits can vary, but the least significant digits change
much faster than the most significant digits. If the counter is big enough and resets
between sessions, the most significant digits may never vary during typical sessions.
Therefore, the metric adopted in this research for byte-level accuracy is to measure
the differences in byte variance between captures. This is accomplished by first es-
tablishing a baseline by measuring the byte variances between all reference captures.
Then, each experimental capture is compared to each reference capture. If the differ-
ences of the two groups are statistically equivalent, then the emulator is determined
to be accurate.
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Finally, it should also be noted that previous research [Jar82, Fin90] also evaluated
honeypots using Nmap fingerprinting and timing. This research, however, focuses on
the application layer. As a result, both Nmap fingerprinting and packet timing are
out of scope.
4.7 Experimental Design
4.7.1 Overview.
The experiments are designed to address the questions posed in Section 4.1. In
order to test how well the SUT can handle various protocols, HTTP, EtherNet/IP,
and ISO-TSAP are chosen for experimentation. Randomness is introduced into the
experiments in order to test accuracy and flexibility. Additionally, the experiments are
completely automated, and they test various numbers of input traces to determine
how many are needed to achieve accuracy. The next two subsections discuss how
variability is introduced into the experimental design and how the number of samples
is chosen.
4.7.2 Introducing variability.
As previously discussed, measuring emulator accuracy for this research requires
assessing differences in the variability of bytes between reference and experimental
captures. Ideally, the variability present in the reference traces is equivalent to that
of traffic generated during normal application use. Additionally, byte variability is
necessary for the emulator to be most effective since this is what allows ScriptGenE.py
to detect mutating regions. Thus, the number of traces required in order to build a
robust emulator is directly proportional to the variability of the input traces.
As a result, variability is purposely introduced while assessing the SUT. Each
task’s packet captures are randomly created for both the reference and experimental
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groups. Additionally, the protocol trees are built using random combinations of the
reference captures. Third, software and hardware are purposely not reset to a known
state unless necessary. The PLC, for instance, is in a running mode and is never reset
during experiments.
RSLogix, however, does have to be reset occasionally. This limitation is due to
the fact that RSLogix continually increments a counter throughout sessions. Thus,
at a minimum, RSLogix must be reset once after completing the reference captures.
Otherwise, all of the experimental runs will potentially use higher counter values
that are not represented in the reference traces. The same problem can occur if
the randomly selected reference traces were both captured around the same time
period. To account for this limitation, RSLogix is reset after a random number of
task runs. The random number’s range is bounded from roughly 33% to 50% of the
total expected number of reference task runs. The expected number of reference task
runs is based on the total number of captures required and the probability a capture
will occur.
4.7.3 Determining the number of required captures.
Next, the number of samples required for the experiments is determined in two
ways. For the HTTP experiment, pilot testing shows that the number of bytes in
the downloaded HTML directories have a standard deviation of about 1.15 bytes.
This is used with a two sample power test in R (statistical software) to determine
the number of samples required to achieve 95% confidence of a one byte difference
with 90% power. The result shows that 59 samples are required. 60 reference samples
are randomly generated for the HTTP experiment, which yields 60 possible emulation
profiles when choosing one capture and 1770 possible emulation profiles when choosing
two captures. 60 emulation profiles are created from the reference captures for each
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level of traces. Thus, for the HTTP experiment 120 total reference and experimental
captures are randomly generated. The chosen capture probability is one in three
traces.
For the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP experiments 60 samples are also desired for
achieving 95% confidence, but the primary samples of consideration are comparisons.
Therefore, the number captures is determined by the number of combinations re-
quired. 12 reference captures are randomly generated. This yields 66 comparisons for
the reference group. Additionally, the reference capture pool yields 220, 495, 792, and
924 possible emulator profiles, respectively, for each trace level. 32 emulator profiles
are selected from each of these groups, yielding 384 comparisons using the experi-
mental captures. In total, for each of the two experiments, 48 reference captures and
128 experimental captures are randomly generated. The chosen capture probability
is one in five traces.
4.8 Evaluation Technique
Overall, the results are evaluated by performing a statistical analysis of the metrics
in R [R14]. Time elapsed and the number of nodes processed per second is evaluated
by performing a one-sample t-test and computing standard statistics such as the
standard deviation, mean, and 95% confidence interval.
Next, as previously discussed in Section 4.6, the PASS/FAIL evaluations for task
output is graded differently for each experiment. For evaluting wget’s response,
one measure to gauge whether or not the task completed is to simply see if the
expected number of bytes were downloaded. Since the replay and wget settings
are setup so that any error will cause the task to exit, this is a reasonable measure
of completeness. The command used to accomplish this is ‘du -sb’. Any HTML
directories downloaded from the emulators that have less bytes than the minimum
number downloaded from the PLC is considered a FAIL.
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A more accurate measure, however, is to find any byte differences between down-
loaded content in reference directories and experimental directories. For static web
sites, a simple recursive diff between two downloaded site copies will yield no dif-
ferences if the emulation is perfect. However, the web server on the L61 is a dynamic
web site. As a result, performing a simple recursive diff as described will yield many
differences. However, these differences are usually in the same locations and occur at
the same frequencies. Therefore, a method of measuring if the wget task completed
is to use a similar technique as the byte accuracy measurement. Instead of comparing
byte-level variability, however, the number of different and identical files is compared
between the reference and experimental groups. This is done using a combination of
diff and grep as shown in Figure 42. As a result, this higher level abstraction is
used to gauge if the wget tasks completed prior to analyzing the byte-level accuracy
using network traces.
Figure 42. Calculating the number of different and identical files between a pair of
directories
The other PASS/FAIL evaluation is for output response of RSLinx and STEP7
in the EtherNet/IP and ISO-TSAP experiments. By default, all tasks are assumed
to be failures unless they complete successfully with the modules being populated as
expected. In RSWho, the modules expected are shown in Figure 43. In particular,
modules 00, 01, and 06 must be present on the backplane as shown in the figure.
Figure 44 shows an exact image of how the corresponding modules are expected to
be seen in STEP7.
The third metric, byte-level accuracy, is evaluated by performing a two-sample
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test to compare the variability between the reference and
experimental groups (normal distributions are not assumed). The variability in this
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Figure 43. A successful emulation session in RSLinux
Figure 44. A successful ISO-TSAP emulation session shows these modules in STEP7
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case is defined as the percentage of different bytes between two captures files. Any
significant differences must be accounted for. Note, differences in the number of
connections are not counted, but differences in the number of messages are counted.
Additionally, the number of different bytes per each client and server message is
evaluated to determine where the conversation changes, how much it changes, and if
the changes are significant. An example of the variability found in reference group
server messages is shown in Figure 45. Each dot in the scatterplot represents the
number of different bytes found when comparing two server messages from different
reference captures. The x-axis corresponds to each of the 35 server messages in
the trace files. In total, there are 12 captures represented in the figure, yielding 66
comparisons. As can be seen in the figure, the first server message never varies, and
the second message varies by one byte. The remainder of the conversation varies
consistently between three and six bytes until the near the end (at which point two
byte differences are also included).
The maximum variability expected from the reference group is then subtracted
from the corresponding experimental group. Any number of bytes remaining are
potentially incorrect and should be investigated. Referring back to Figure 45, any
byte differences more than six bytes for the third message and beyond would be
unexpected differences unless they can be attributed to environmental links described
in Section 3.6.2.4 (e.g., the PLC IP address ended in ‘.206’, but the emulator IP
address ends with ‘.200’ resulting in a difference of one byte). If the byte differences
are due to environmental links, then this effectively causes the overall percentage of
different bytes to be uniformly increased. This shift is corrected by subtracting the
percentage of byte differences due to environmental links.
Overall, the described approach is similar to the whitelist approach previously
discussed in Section 4.6, but it is done in a way that automatically detects how many
126
●
●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
 



          
		 
 
 


Figure 45. Number of different bytes per server message as compared to other reference
captures
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bytes per message should be whitelisted. Finally, by using this method to key in
on the different messages of interest, byte-level differences can be examined in the
accompanying diff outputs of the hexdumps.
Evaluating failed tests. Finally, for both experiments, any test cases that
fail are evaluated to determine the cause. This involves checking the logs for error
and warning conditions, along with examining message differences. Unknown transi-
tions in the replay log, for instance, should be investigated. The tools described in
Section 4.9.3 provide the means to accomplish the required analysis. Additionally,
Wireshark is used to manually inspect packet captures.
4.9 Experimental Setup
4.9.1 Overview of experimental setup.
The experimental setup, as shown in Figure 46, includes three physical machines.
A L61 PLC, S7-300 PLC, and a HP laptop are connected by a Cisco SG 100D-
08 switch. The laptop hosts three VMs whose experimental network interfaces are
bridged from the laptop’s physical interface. The Honeydrive Linux VM contains the
SUT and runs wget. The Windows XP VM on the left runs RSLinx, and the other
Windows XP VM runs STEP7. Because the VMs share a physical network interface,
they can see each other’s network traffic as if they were connected by a hub. Thus,
all packet captures can occur on one VM. Network traffic is captured using tshark
with a capture filter set to the port of interest. Next, the Linux VM is used to run
the experiments and collect all data using a set of custom scripts. Finally, in order
for RSLinx and STEP7 to be fully automated, SikuliX scripts are used. These are
controlled remotely by a simple server setup on each of the Windows XP VMs.
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Figure 46. Experimental Setup
4.9.2 Machine configurations.
As discussed in the overview the experimental setup uses three physical machines
and three VMs. The PLC configurations were discussed in Section 4.5.2. The laptop
configuration is as follows:
Hewlett-Packard EliteBook 8570w
• Microsoft Windows 7 Service Pack 1
• 2.6GHz Intel Core i7-3720QM processor (4 cores)
• 16GB RAM
• Plugable USB 2.0 Ethernet adapter
• VMware Workstation version 10.0.1 build-1379776
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Next, the honeypot VM is a distribution of Linux called Honeydrive [Kon14].
Honeydrive is a third-party variation of Xubuntu LTS that adds over 10 pre-installed
and pre-configured honeypots packages (such as conpot discussed in Section 2.3.1).
Additionally, it contains many scripts and utilities for analyzing logs and malware,
forensics, and network monitoring. As such, it is a natural choice for honeypot re-
search. The Honeydrive VM settings and relevant software versions for this research
are listed in Table 1.
Table 1. Linux VM configuration
Honeydrive 3 (Royal Jelly)
2 processor cores Linux kernel 3.2.0 bash 4.2.25
2 GB RAM Python 2.7.3 tshark 1.6.7
80 GB HD space gcc 4.6.3 wget 1.13.4
Additionally, authbind is used to allow a regular user to run a server on priv-
ileged ports. This is needed for both HTTP and ISO-TSAP emulation. To set up
authbind for port 80, for instance, a blank executable file must be created once at
/etc/authbind/byport/80.
Next, the Windows XP VMs include many special vendor software applications
such as the RSLogix suite. The Windows XP VM settings and relevant software
versions for the EtherNet/IP experiment are listed in Table 2. The VM used for the
ISO-TSAP experiment has the same virtual hardware and utility software, but the
VM has STEP7 software version 5.5 installed instead of the RSLogix suite.
4.9.3 Experimental scripts.
Several scripts are used to run the experiments and aggregate collected data for
analysis in R [R14]. The scripts developed are as follows:
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Table 2. Windows XP VM configuration
Windows XP Service Pack 3
2 processor cores RSLogix V19.01.00 python 2.7.2
3 GB RAM ControlFLASH Java 1.7.0u60
60 GB HD space RSLinx Classic 2.59.02 SikuliX 1.1.0
ScriptGenEdir.py
• Runs ScriptGenE.py using random combinations of Pcaps from a directory
diffPcapDir.py
• Uses diffPcaps.py to collect diff data on all combination of reference and
experimental Pcaps in a directory.
• diff data is exported into text files for import into R statistical software.
enip-exp.sh
• Runs the EtherNet/IP experiment
• Uses RobotServer to control RSLinx remotely
wget-exp.sh
• Runs the HTTP experiment
wget-results.sh
• Computes the measurements for the HTTP experiment:
– Pcap differences
– Number identical / different HTML files
– HTML directory sizes
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RobotClient.py
• Controls the RobotServer to run GUI tasks powered by SikuliX
• Sends one command to the RobotServer and gets PASS or FAIL result
kill Robot.sh
• Helper script that shuts down the RobotServer
4.9.4 Graphical User Interface automation.
In addition to the scripts introduced in the prior subsection, there are several
SikuliX scripts that are used to control RSLinx. SikuliX allows anything that can be
seen on the screen of a computer to be automated [Hoc15], and it is the successor of
the original Sikuli Script project developed in 2009 [YCM09]. SikuliX uses OpenCV
image recognition software to identify GUI components and optionally Tesseract for
text recognition. SikuliX can emulate mouse and keyboard events. What makes
SikuliX really powerful, however, is that the actions it performs are scripted using
Jython or JRuby (Java variants of Python and Ruby, respectively). This allows the
scripts to be easily integrated with other software. Additionally, SikuliX includes
an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) that aides in taking screenshots and
using the API correctly.
Five SikuliX scripts are created that together manage the RSLinx drivers and run
the RSWho task. Four additional scripts control STEP7. Finally, separate batch
scripts restart RSLinx and the STEP7 node drivers. These are all controlled by
RobotServer.py. The server has a limited set of tasks that it performs. Each request
must be preceded by ‘RUN’. The set of tasks are:
Driver ’STOP DRIVER’, ’START DRIVER’, ’RESTART DRIVER’,
’DEL DRIVER’, ’CONFIG DRIVER’
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RSLinx ’SHUTDOWN’, ’START’, ’RESTART’
STEP7 = ’DEL OBJECTS’, ’CONFIG NODE’, ’RESTART STEP7’
Conversations ’RSWHO’, ‘STEP7BROWSE’
During the experiments the server is controlled by RobotClient.py, but it can just
as easily be controlled by netcat. Figure 47 shows an example session controlled by
netcat that clearly shows how the server interacts with a client. As can be seen in
the figure, the server echoes back the command it runs and replies back with status
after completion.
Figure 47. Example RobotServer session controlled by netcat
Next, the RSWho script run in the EtherNet/IP experiment is set up so that
the traffic it generates is controlled. The main issue is that the ‘autobrowse’ setting
in RSWho will automatically browse the network and PLC components. Thus, the
script turns that setting off. However, autobrowse is automatically renabled when
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the RSWho window regains focus. To prevent extraneous traffic generation, the
RSLinx driver is deleted and reconfigured between runs. The RSWho command seen
in Figure 47, for instance, configures a driver for IP address 192.168.1.206. With
‘autobrowse’ disabled, traffic is then generated every time the ‘refresh’ button is
clicked in RSWho. The script looks for certain images to determine if the task run
is a PASS or FAIL. Figure 48 shows a script snippet opened in the SikuliX IDE that
does this. The image as shown in the figure that designates a PASS is an image of
the backplane with the three PLC modules shown.
Figure 48. RSWho SikuliX script snippet
4.9.5 Configuring and running experiments.
Both experiments are run via the shell scripts introduced previously. Each experi-
ment’s script begins by loading a corresponding configuration file (wget-exp.conf and
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enip-exp.conf). These files control all of the options described previously. In addition,
they define the output directories, IP addresses, ports, and more. If desired, singu-
lar configuration options can be overridden at runtime. For example, the following
command changes the number of experimental captures to collect to six:
NUMPCAPS=6 ./enip-exp.sh &> ../logs/enip-exp.log
4.10 Methodology Summary
In summary, this chapter describes the methodology used to measure the accuracy,
flexibility, and efficiency of the ScriptGenE Framework. This is accomplished by
running three experiments that use different workloads and an increasing number of
network traces to build and test emulators.
All three experiments use various scripts developed for this research in order to
autonomously run application tasks, collect packet captures, build protocol trees, test
emulator profiles, and process data. Application tasks are run repeatedly against an
Allen-Bradley L61 PLC or Siemens S7-300 PLC to generate network traffic. A set of
reference packet captures are randomly generated, and then random combinations of
these captures are used with a set of build options to create various emulator profiles.
Each emulator profile is then used with a set of replay options in order to emulate
PLC responses during task sessions. This generates experimental captures.
The experiments are first evaluated by measuring how much time elapsed while
building the trees and how many nodes per second can be processed during each pro-
tocol tree build. Second, byte-level variability is measured in the groups of reference
captures, and this is compared to the differences in bytes between experimental and
reference captures. Third, each task is evaluated as a PASS or FAIL based on its
successful completion. The first experiment uses wget to generate HTTP traffic,
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and downloaded HTML files are evaluated to score each task run as a PASS or FAIL.
The other two experiments uses RSLinx or STEP7 to generate traffic, and the task
runs are considered a PASS if PLC modules can be browsed in the GUI.
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V. Results and Analysis
5.1 High-level Summary
Table 3 below shows the results summary for both experiments. As can be seen in
the table, all of the P-trees can be built in 6.074 seconds or less. This is well below the
5 minute requirement. Next, the task pass rate shows that only one trace is needed
to emulate HTTP well enough for wget to download the same files. Additionally,
only five EtherNet/IP traces are required to correctly populate all PLC modules in
RSLinx 100% of the time. It should be noted that all passing tasks for HTTP and
ENIP have zero incorrect bytes. The ISO-TSAP runs all passed (even with only
two traces), but some of the experimental traces have two different bytes that are
potentially incorrect.
Table 3. High-level summary of results
Protocol Captures Average Task Pass
% Difference
Time (sec) Rate 95% conf interval p-value
HTTP
1 5.549 100% -0.0057 0.0044 0.8836
2 6.074 100% -0.0127 -0.0047 5.652e-05
ENIP
3 2.634 75% 0.0125 0.0135 0.0009
4 2.799 93.75% 0.0117 0.0118 3.755e-05
5 2.963 100% 0.0103 0.0102 5.992e-06
6 3.168 100% 0.0168 0.0178 0.0259
ISO-TSAP
2 0.323 100% 0.0100 0.0100 < 2.2e-16
3 0.404 100% 3.524e-06 0.0100 2.461e-11
4 0.501 100% 0.0100 0.0100 < 2.2e-16
5 0.643 100% 0.0100 0.0100 4.789e-14
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The percent differences in bytes between passing experimental and reference group
traces generally show that the variation in the traffic produced by the emulators
is different than what is produced by the PLC. The one exception is the HTTP
experimental run using one input capture per emulator. For the other data sets,
the differences are always less than 0.018% in the 95% confidence intervals. For
EtherNet/IP, this equates to less than one byte per session. The maximum differences
in the ISO-TSAP traces are one byte per TCP connection.
5.2 Experiment #1 - HTTP
5.2.1 Build efficiency and qualities.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize how long it took to build the P-trees. With 95% confi-
dence, it can be expected that each tree will build in less than 6.1 seconds. Tables 6
and 7 show how many nodes per second can be processed while building protocol
trees for the HTTP experiment. Most processing time while building protocol trees
is generally spent clustering and aligning, but Macroclustering is disabled in this ex-
periment. Thus, the P-trees are built very quickly. The average RRP size is about
2.4KB over 60 RRPs. For the trees built from one Pcap, no edges are combined, but
environmental links are found. For the trees built from two Pcaps, exactly half of the
edges are combined during the initial tree consolidation. This means that each node
in the tree has two equally weighted responses to randomly choose from.
Finally, the automatically selected default error messages are tiny image files (ei-
ther ‘spacer.gif’ or ‘border.gif’). A 404 error page is present in the traces in response
to requests for robots.txt, but the error page is stylized and is much larger than
the tiny image files. In pilot testing, the current heuristic picked correct HTTP er-
ror messages by default, and in other cases it picks a short redirect page. Future
enhancements to the default error message heuristic may be needed.
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Table 4. HTTP protocol tree build time (sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
1 5.549 0.054 5.480 5.510 5.540 5.570 5.780
2 6.074 0.083 5.970 6.028 6.055 6.093 6.350
Table 5. HTTP protocol tree build time confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
1 5.535 5.563
2 6.053 6.096
Table 6. HTTP protocol tree throughput (nodes/sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
1 10.813 0.103 10.376 10.770 10.831 10.881 10.950
2 19.762 0.264 18.906 19.693 19.816 19.924 20.101
Table 7. HTTP protocol tree throughput confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
1 10.787 10.840
2 19.693 19.830
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5.2.2 Successful task completions.
As shown previously, 100% of the wget tasks resulted in a PASS. However, ini-
tially this does not appear to be the case. Figure 49 shows that some of the HTML
directories generated by the one-trace emulators are smaller in content than those
downloaded from the PLC. The reason for this is that 5 of the 60 reference captures
are missing at least one packet. Thus, the five emulator profiles that use those input
traces omit the data in their responses. The same issue occurs in the two-trace emu-
lators because 1 of the 60 reference captures is missing a packet. Since the issue is a
problem with tshark and not the SUT, the tasks are scored as a PASS.
●
●
●
●
●
Figure 49. Number of bytes in HTML directories for each test group
It is unknown why tshark dropped packets. It is plausible that too many intensive
processes were running on the physical host at the time, causing tshark or the VMware
network driver to have difficulty keeping up. It is recommended that future work use
separate physical machines instead of VMs.
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Finally, the file diff analysis shows that the emulators generally have one more
different file than the reference directories. This is due to a difference in environmental
information. Specially, the root web page contains the hostname, which is the same
as the server IP address in this experiment.
5.2.3 Byte-level variability.
In fact, environmental links play a big role in the HTTP tasks. Figure 50 shows
that there is consistently at least one byte that is different in all of the client messages
seen during the wget tasks. All of the GET requests contain the hostname. Thus,
at least one byte (192.168.2.200 versus 192.168.2.206) is expected to be different for
every client message. Additionally, all client messages after the first three use a
referrer field which also contains the server IP address.
● ● ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
Figure 50. Number of potentially incorrect bytes per client message found in experi-
mental traces - all attributed to environmental links
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Next, Figure 51 shows that three of the server messages generated by the emula-
tors have different bytes. As previously mentioned, the root web page (first message)
contains the hostname. The message is actually a HTML redirect page, and it con-
tains two copies of the hostname. The other two messages contain the server IP
address. Overall, all of the byte differences in the client and server messages are
due to differences in environmental link values. Thus, there are no incorrect bytes
generated by the emulators.
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
● ●
●
●
Figure 51. Number of potentially incorrect bytes per server message found in experi-
mental traces - all attributed to environmental links
Figures 52 and 53, along with corresponding Tables 8 and 9, show the overall
percent different bytes between the HTTP captures as compared to the reference
capture group. The boxplots for the one-trace test in Figure 52 are nearly identical,
and this is confirmed by the p-value of 0.8836 from the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test. The null hypothesis is accepted, and the two groups are considered identical
populations. Only bytes for environmental links are changed.
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Figure 52. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
One Pcap per HTTP emulator profile
Table 8. Statistics for percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference
Pcaps - One Pcap per HTTP emulator profile
Platform mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
Emulator 1.350 1.053 0.002 0.269 1.762 1.823 5.184
PLC 1.370 1.047 0.154 0.270 1.764 1.823 5.182
Table 9. Statistics for percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference
Pcaps - Two Pcaps per HTTP emulator profile
Platform mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
Emulator 1.029 0.870 0.040 0.257 0.293 1.706 3.472
PLC 1.138 0.900 0.152 0.264 1.644 1.716 3.457
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Figure 53. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Two Pcaps per HTTP emulator profile
However, the emulators built with two traces are not statistically equivalent to
the reference group. In fact, as can be seen in Figure 53, the emulators generally
generate less variability than the PLC. This is due to the fact that the emulators
randomly choose between two server messages to respond to every client request.
This inherently spreads differences out across the session, since either source trace
can be used for a given response. Pilot testing with more input traces confirms that
this trend continues with more traces. However, sometimes equivalent server messages
between traces lead to a particular response being more heavily weighted.
5.3 Experiment #2 - EtherNet/IP
5.3.1 Build efficiency and qualities.
Tables 10 and 11 summarize how long the P-trees take to build. The time re-
quired continues to go up as more traces are added, but it can be expected with
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95% confidence that a tree built with six traces or less can be built in less than 3.22
seconds.
Table 10. EtherNet/IP protocol tree build time (sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
3 2.634 0.144 2.520 2.550 2.565 2.620 2.980
4 2.799 0.138 2.590 2.730 2.785 2.813 3.260
5 2.963 0.175 2.820 2.858 2.890 2.978 3.650
6 3.168 0.141 2.920 3.098 3.145 3.260 3.540
Table 11. EtherNet/IP protocol tree build time confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
3 2.583 2.686
4 2.750 2.849
5 2.899 3.026
6 3.117 3.219
Tables 12 and 13 show the throughput achieved while building protocol trees for
the RSLinx task. Unlike the HTTP experiment, most of the processing time is spent
clustering/aligning edges. Only the first two edges are initially consolidated. These
correspond to the initial data handshake and register session commands between
RSLinx and the PLC. The final trees consist of one branch since all branches from
input traces merge together.
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Table 12. EtherNet/IP protocol tree throughput (nodes/sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
3 39.970 2.032 35.270 40.039 40.925 41.218 41.648
4 50.117 2.311 42.972 49.838 50.321 51.236 54.147
5 59.245 3.142 47.917 58.704 60.556 61.289 61.969
6 66.416 2.912 59.335 64.484 66.837 67.817 71.864
Table 13. EtherNet/IP protocol tree throughput confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
3 39.970 39.237
4 49.283 50.950
5 58.112 60.378
6 65.367 67.466
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5.3.2 Successful task completions.
Unfortunately, some of the merged edges for the P-trees have erroneous gaps in
the aligned sequences. Figure 54 shows a particularly problematic example that is
fairly common in P-trees built with two or three input traces. The figure shows that
the gaps inserted during alignment result in a fixed region that should not be there.
This typically causes an unknown transition to occur during replay unless the client
request happens to coincidentally match the erroneous fixed region. The cluster shown
in Figure 54 belongs to one of the three-trace emulators, and its test is a PASS in spite
of the unknown transitions caused by the gaps. The backtracking algorithm enables
the emulator to recover and continue with the rest of the conversation correctly.
The default error message for this experiment, on the other hand, does not appear
to help “entice” the client to continue the conversation. Pilot testing shows that
repeating the previous message can satisfy what RSLinx/RSLogix is looking for, but
only in cases were the sender context (discussed next) is not in effect. Changing the
default error messages to use intra-protocol links may resolve this issue.
Overall, the biggest barrier to successful task completion in this experiment is
having enough variety in the input traces in order to replay sender context correctly.
As shown in Figure 55, sender context is an eight byte field within the structure of an
EtherNet/IP header (the numbers along the top of the figure correspond to bytes).
The values are generated by the client (e.g., RSLinx), and they behave like a counter.
Any server response that does not match the client’s sender context is effectively
ignored by the client. Because the sender context acts like a counter, some bytes are
never varied during a session. As a result, random input traces often incorrectly infer
fixed regions that cause issues during replay.
The sampling issue can be overcome by using more input traces. The results show
that a minimum of five input traces are required in order to achieve a 100% PASS
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Figure 54. RA output showing a problematic fixed field between gaps
Figure 55. EtherNet/IP header [Dun13]
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rate for this experiment. Other experimental setups may require a different number
of traces. It should also be noted that longer traces typically enable easier recovery
from unknown transitions since the backtracking algorithm has more transitions to
pick from.
Overall, it is observed that the number of required traces to achieve desired vari-
ability can be determined by first quantifying the number of bytes that vary for
important fields (e.g., sender context) during normal operations. Once this number
is known, trees can be iteratively built in successively greater numbers of random
input traces until the number of bytes required vary. For instance, in this experiment
it is observed that the sender context field generally varies at most by 5 out of 8
bytes for all combinations of reference traces. Thus, any protocol trees that also have
mutating regions representing 5 out of 8 sender context bytes generally are successful
during replay. Protocol trees with 4 out of 8 bytes varying are sometimes successful,
and those with less are rarely successful. This process can be automated by creatively
parsing the tree build logs and is left for future work. It should be noted, however,
that the proposed process requires knowing which fields are important, which is not
protocol-agnostic. The process also assumes a consistent workload.
5.3.3 Byte-level variability.
Next, like the HTTP experiment, environmental links do play a role for this
experiment. However, the selected conversation only uses the server IP address in
one client message and one server message, so the role is limited.
Figures 56 through 59 show boxplots that compare the overall byte-level variability
between the EtherNet/IP emulators and the reference groups. The corresponding
table is Table 14. As can be seen in the figures, the variability is very similar, but not
the same. It is hypothesized that the current link proposal consolidation algorithm
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(shown in Algorithm 4) has a role in the loss of variability. Given two equally weighted
unique proposals that have an equal number of links, one is randomly selected (the
“first” one). This could potentially result in the same spreading of byte differences
as described for HTML in Section 5.2.3. Future work could revise the algorithm to
append the additional proposals in a list in order to preserve the information.
●
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Figure 56. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Three Pcaps per EtherNet/IP emulator profile
Next, Table 14 shows that the six-capture tests resulted in higher byte-level vari-
ability in both the reference and experimental groups. Viewing the byte differences
on the message level reveals that these traces generally had one additional byte that
was different than previous tests. The different byte corresponds to the server-set ses-
sion handle (another counter), which coincidentally happened to count high enough
to change a more significant byte.
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Figure 57. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Four Pcaps per EtherNet/IP emulator profile
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Figure 58. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Five Pcaps per EtherNet/IP emulator profile
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●
Figure 59. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Six Pcaps per EtherNet/IP emulator profile
Table 14. Statistics for percent different bytes between EtherNet/IP emulator Pcap
files compared to reference Pcaps
Captures Platform mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
3
Emulator 8.628 1.439 1.664 8.166 9.053 9.792 9.792
PLC 8.808 1.335 3.670 8.153 9.778 9.778 9.778
4
Emulator 8.724 1.350 4.888 8.139 9.790 9.790 9.790
PLC 8.765 1.410 3.276 8.153 9.778 9.778 9.778
5
Emulator 8.893 1.308 3.260 8.162 9.788 9.788 9.788
PLC 9.059 1.356 4.409 8.153 9.778 9.778 9.778
6
Emulator 9.671 1.610 1.668 8.170 9.796 11.446 11.446
PLC 9.803 1.600 6.379 8.153 9.778 11.429 11.429
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5.4 Experiment #3 - ISO-TSAP
5.4.1 Build efficiency and qualities.
Tables 15 and 16 summarize how long the P-trees take to build for this experiment.
In contrast to the other experiments, the trees all build in less than one second. The
reason these trees build much faster than the others is because there is a significantly
greater portion of fixed regions in the input traces for this experiment.
Table 15. ISO-TSAP protocol tree build time (sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
2 0.323 0.007 0.310 0.320 0.320 0.330 0.340
3 0.404 0.007 0.400 0.400 0.400 0.410 0.420
4 0.501 0.007 0.490 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.520
5 0.643 0.014 0.630 0.630 0.640 0.650 0.680
Table 16. ISO-TSAP protocol tree build time confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
2 0.321 0.326
3 0.401 0.406
4 0.499 0.504
5 0.638 0.649
Tables 17 and 18 show the build throughput statistics. It is interesting that the
throughput actually decreased using 5 input traces versus 4. This could be an anomaly
related to the amount of concurrent processing going on within the experimental
setup. Additionally, this experiment builds trees with a much higher throughput
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than the others. This is partially due to the greater proportion of fixed regions, but
it is also due to the fact that approximately half of the client messages are only 7
bytes long.
Table 17. ISO-TSAP protocol tree throughput (nodes/sec)
traces mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
2 489.587 10.479 465.448 483.977 494.335 496.212 502.447
3 586.523 8.947 562.582 583.831 589.212 591.667 596.609
4 630.640 8.189 605.564 628.993 632.154 635.343 644.167
5 614.605 13.522 580.078 605.919 617.677 625.450 631.110
Table 18. ISO-TSAP protocol tree throughput confidence intervals
traces
95% conf. interval
lower upper
2 485.808 493.365
3 583.298 589.749
4 627.687 633.592
5 609.730 619.480
Finally, the protocol traces observed in this experiment are unique from the other
experiments in that they consist of two connections of substantial length (49 and 30
RRPs, respectively). Figure 60 show the structure of the initial tree on the left that
is generalized into to the smaller final tree on the right. The initial tree was created
using two input traces each containing two connections. As can be seen in Figure 60,
ScriptGenE’s clustering algorithms yield a final tree with the distinct paths correctly
maintained. This is significant since the clustering algorithms are not sufficient to
cluster the stateless HTTP traces. The first three RRPs in this experiment are
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correctly combined as shown at top of final tree. These initial messages appear to
establish each connection.
5.4.2 Successful task completions.
As previously shown in Section 5.1, all of the task runs for this experiment com-
pleted correctly. However, the SikuliX scripts occasionally falsely reported a FAIL
due to the modules being obfuscated by another window. Future work can increase
the robustness of the SikuliX scripts.
5.4.3 Byte-level variability.
Table 19 shows that the experimental traces consistently have more variability
than the reference traces. In fact, the traces generated by the PLC maintain a fixed
amount of variability (0.058%).
Table 19. Statistics for percent different bytes between ISO-TSAP emulator Pcap files
compared to reference Pcaps
Captures Platform mean std dev min Q1 median Q3 max
2
Emulator 0.068 0.008 0.029 0.068 0.068 0.077 0.077
PLC 0.058 0.000 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
3
Emulator 0.063 0.008 0.019 0.058 0.068 0.068 0.077
PLC 0.058 0.000 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
4
Emulator 0.065 0.009 0.019 0.058 0.068 0.068 0.077
PLC 0.058 0.000 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
5
Emulator 0.065 0.009 0.019 0.058 0.068 0.068 0.077
PLC 0.058 0.000 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
The differences in variability are more apparent in Figures 61 and 62. Figure 61
shows the differences in variability when using two input traces, while Figure 62
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Figure 60. Initial and final trees for STEP7 browse task using two input traces
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shows the differences in variability when using three input traces. Charts equivalent
to Figure 62 are generated for four and five input traces, respectively, and are not
shown. Comparing Figures 61 and 62, it can be seen that the experimental are more
similar to the reference traces when using at least three input traces. Thus, even
though STEP7’s output was the same for all tests, using three input traces may be
preferable over using only two input traces. Since many of the messages are fixed and
can be trivially matched, it is hypothesized that random server response choices may
affect the achieved variability.
●
●
●
Figure 61. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Two Pcaps per ISO-TSAP emulator profile
Additionally, it should be noted that no environmental links are detected, but
they could exist. The experimental traces are different from the reference traces by
one byte per TCP connection. The significance of these bytes is unknown.
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Figure 62. Percent different bytes between Pcap files compared to reference Pcaps -
Three Pcaps per ISO-TSAP emulator profile
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VI. Conclusions
6.1 Introduction
This final chapter summarizes the research conclusions. Section 6.2 presents the
conclusions obtained from experimentation. Section 6.3 discusses the research im-
pacts. Finally, Section 6.4 provides recommendations for future related research.
6.2 Research Conclusions
This research is successful in achieving its goals of developing a proof of concept
framework for automatically configuring PLC emulators. The design parameters from
Section 3.2 are translated into experimental goals detailed in Section 4.1. Overall,
the experiments show that the ScriptGenE Framework satisfies the goals of accuracy,
flexibility, and efficiency.
6.2.1 Accuracy.
Results show that with as little as one input trace for HTTP that an Allen-Bradley
PLC webserver can be accurately emulated to respond correctly to wget requests
attempting to mirror the site. Additionally, with as little as five input EtherNet/IP
traces, an accurate emulator can be created that is identified by RSLinx as a PLC with
modules. For the ISO-TSAP experiment, a minimum of two traces are required to
allow STEP7 to browse for an emulator. However, the ISO-TSAP emulators produce
potentially one incorrect byte per TCP connection. The other protocol emulators
achieve zero incorrect bytes. Overall, the emulators produce traffic that differs in
variability from the reference capture group by less than 0.018% with 95% confidence.
This equates to less than a one byte difference per EtherNet/IP session on average. It
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is hypothesized that the variability can be improved upon by limiting random choices
to one source trace profile per session.
6.2.2 Flexibility.
Next, the experiments show that the framework is flexible enough to automatically
emulate a variety of protocols without any protocol-specific knowledge. The tested
protocols, HTTP, EtherNet/IP, and ISO-TSAP, represent differing text and binary
protocols. Additionally, the framework is found to be flexible during replay. By using
the novel backtracking algorithm, the replay engine is able to recover from unknown
transitions and complete tasks conversations.
6.2.3 Efficiency.
Next, the developed framework builds protocol trees and emulates devices auto-
matically. This is proved by the fully automated experimental methodology. Ev-
erything is automated from creating input traces, building protocol trees, replaying
traffic, and data collection and aggregation. The input traces required for 100% ac-
ceptance rate by standard interrogating tools also meets the requirement of less than
seven traces. Finally, the protocol trees are built very fast. Each of the P-trees
created in this research’s experiments can each be built in less than 6.1 seconds.
6.3 Significance of Research
6.3.1 Contributions.
This research provides numerous contributions. For one, it represents the first
successful attempt at automatically developing emulators for EtherNet/IP devices.
Unlike similar works designed for IT networks, ScriptGenE requires less traces, can
efficiently mimic long polling sessions through looping, and recover from unknown
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transitions. Both looping and recovery use the novel backtracking algorithm presented
in this research. ScriptGenE also discovers environmental and protocol dependency
links, while innovative filtering algorithms inspired by ScriptGen are used to remove
trivial links. Additionally, the research methodology presented provides an effective
means to evaluate emulator accuracy for unknown protocols. Finally, a thorough
literature survey is provided that ties the related fields of honeypots and protocol
reverse engineering together. This is done in order to assess the various techniques
and technologies that can be used for effective protocol-agnostic emulation.
6.3.2 Applications.
The applications of the above contributions are numerous. In addition to pro-
viding stand alone honeypots, ScriptGenE can be used to enhance hybrid network
sensors in order to provide enhanced intrusion detection capabilities, capture and
contain malware, and develop auto-learning firewalls or intrusion prevention sensors.
Additionally, the tools can be used for client and server fuzzing. Finally, ScriptGenE
provides tools that are useful for network security training and future research.
6.4 Future Work
6.4.1 Overview of recommendations.
Recommendations for future work fall into three main categories. The first cate-
gory relates to additional testing and test enhancements. The second category is for
enhancing current algorithms for improved clustering, linking, and replay behavior.
The final category discussed is for integrating ScriptGenE into hybrid network sensor
applications.
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6.4.2 Testing.
Future research should consider performing additional testing on the framework.
First, there are many more EtherNet/IP tasks that can be tested such as program
upload, program download, go online, and firmware update. SikuliX scripts can be
employed again to develop automated tests. Additionally, more PLC configurations
should be considered in testing. These can include devices from other vendors that
use different protocols.
Testing may also be enhanced by using tcpdump instead of tshark for capturing.
Using different machine configurations may also prevent loss of packets. Additionally,
ScriptGenE’s ability to detect missing packets can be enhanced. Finally, as discussed
in Section 5.3.2, enhanced tree quality indicators may be able to be determined based
upon observed number of mutating regions versus the variability observed in reference
traces.
6.4.3 Enhancing current ScriptGenE algorithms.
Next, the current implementation of ScriptGenE can be improved upon in many
ways. The primary areas for improvement are clustering, linking, and replay behavior.
6.4.3.1 Improving clustering.
One technique that has been proven to significantly improve clustering is micro-
clustering based upon region-wide mutation rates [LMD05]. Additionally, testing
should be done to determine the maximum message and/or cluster size that is still
useful to Macrocluster server messages. Once this is determined, Macroclustering
server messages can be automatically turned off when the threshold is exceeded. Fi-
nally, trivial links may be able to be used for discovering delimiters. For example,
pilot testing shows that typical trivial links for HTTP are ‘\r\n’, which also hap-
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pen to denote the end of a line. The delimiters can then be used for enhanced field
identification. Thus, trivial links may have a legitimate use.
6.4.3.2 Improving linking.
Several improvements can be made to the link algorithms. Intra-protocol links, for
instance, currently only recognize relationships between adjacent messages. However,
often the relationships span through the majority of messages throughout a session.
These global links could be identified and used to enhance the current link identi-
fication schemes. This is particularly important for branches that diverge on their
own since unclustered edges do not obtain links. Thus, global links can infer links
in other messages as needed. Determining different kinds of byte relationships (such
as a counter) can also be explored. Finally, environmental links can be improved
upon by adding additional link types (e.g., length fields), expanding the representa-
tions allowed for the current types, and auto-detecting host names from DNS packets.
Filtering trivial environmental links of less than four bytes may also be worth consid-
ering. “80”, for example, would make a rather short port link and may coincidentally
appear in data.
6.4.3.3 Improving replay.
Additionally, replay can be enhanced in many ways. For instance, it is often
observed that clients will continue to send messages even after an erroneous server
response is sent. Thus, after sending a default error message, the next needed response
is in the next state rather than past states. As a result, it is proposed that a look-ahead
feature be added to the backtracking algorithm for increased efficiency. Additionally,
new options could limit how many nodes will be backtracked, or an option could
disable the BFS feature.
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As discussed previously, replay can also be improved by limiting random response
choices. Once the first random selection is made, future random response considera-
tions can attempt to use the same source trace. The same feature can also apply to
multiple link proposals.
A third area of improving replay is to research the usefulness of using links in
default error messages. New heuristics may also improve their utility.
Finally, replay can be greatly enhanced by allowing more than one concurrent
session. This would open more possibilities for testing as well.
6.4.4 Hybrid network sensor integration.
Allowing for more than one connection is also a prerequisite for discovering and
handling inter-protocol dependencies [LDM06]. This and other improvements would
allow for tight integration with hybrid network sensors.
6.4.4.1 Application layer integration.
One such needed improvement is the ability for ScriptGenE to be incrementally
updated (i.e., update a current tree using new input traces). Previous research has
used this to integrate honeypots with proxies such as those described in Section 2.3.5.
ScriptGenE also includes initial capabilities for using missed handshake sessions that
can be fully implemented. The primary idea is to take each branch and match it up
with sequence of messages along the tree. An algorithm similar to identifying links
in data chunks (Section 3.6.2.6) can be employed at the message level to accomplish
this. Incremental updates can then be done to the tree to merge the new data.
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6.4.4.2 Transport layer integration.
In addition to the application layer improvements described previously, Script-
GenE could also be integrated with additional software for transport layer emulation
such as those described in Section 2.3.2. Honeyd is a popular option, and it has been
shown that automatically configuring it using network sniffers is effective [VM14].
Collaboration with the Idaho National Labs research team may prove highly bene-
ficial for integrating ScriptGenE’s flexible application layer replay with their hybrid
IDS sensor network [VML14].
6.4.5 Miscellaneous.
Finally, there are a few miscellaneous improvements that can be made such as
handling IPv6 and UDP traffic. Timing issues may also be considered. Finally, a tree
visualization and manipulation tool may be desirable (particularly for demonstration
purposes). The Python Environment for Tree Exploration may be a good library to
consider.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In summary, this final chapter presents the research conclusions and impacts.
Additionally, many ideas for future work were discussed that, along with previous
research, build upon the foundational ScriptGenE Framework presented in this re-
search.
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